COMMENTS AND NOTES
THE EFFLUENT FEE APPROACH FOR
CONTROLLING AIR POLLUTION
Man's industrial growth in the past century has resulted in
extensive environmental modifications, a primary one being the
pollution of the atmosphere. Paradoxically, classical economists
viewed air as a free economic good;' the supply was assumed to

outweigh the amount which could be sold at the lowest finite price.
The resource of air is exhaustible, however, and the price for its

consumption has remained zero only because the cost of internalizing
pollution damage within property systems has heretofore been
thought greater than the possible gains. Cost-benefit studies now
indicate the need for such internalization. The serious nature of the
damages wrought by air pollution and its threat to the very existence

of man is dramatically and convincingly illustrated by the air
pollution disasters. 2 Over five thousand deaths and tens of thousands

of injuries 3 have been attributed to these episodes where excessive
amounts of pollution combined with unusual meteorological
conditions to create a lethal atmosphere. The requisite meteriologic

and pollution conditions capable of causing similar disasters exist
periodically in many industrial areas of the United States. These
situations reflect only a small part of the diversity and extent of air
pollution damage; effects on individuals from sustained exposure to

present urban pollution.levels vary from annoying to fatal. Pollution
I. See Crocker,Some Economics ofAir Pollution Control,8 NAT. RES. J. 236 (1968)..
2. These disasters include: Meuse Valley, Belgium, 1930; Donora, Pa., 1948; London,
England, 1952 and 1962; and Poza Rica, Mexico, 1950. Episodes also occurred in New York in
1953, 1963, and 1968. See Cassell, Health Effects and Control Implications, 33 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 195, 201-04 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Cassell]; Goldsmith, Effects of Air
Pollution on Human Health, in I AIR POLLUTION 547 (A. Stern ed., 2d ed. 1968).
3. See STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON AIR AND WATER POLLUTION OF THE SENATE COMM. ON
PUBLIC WORKS, 90TH CONG., 2D SESS., AIR QUALITY CRITERIA 34 (Comm. print 1968)
[hereinafter cited as STAFF REPORT]. Those having preexisting respiratory ailments are very
susceptible to such pollution conditions and account for a large percentage of the disaster
deaths.
4. The presence of beryllium in the atmosphere, for example, may cause the often-fatal
condition of berylliosis. See Heck v. Beryllium Corp., 424 Pa. 140, 226 A.2d 87 (1966). Cancer
of the lung and the esophagus has also been linked to specific pollutants. See generally Cassell;
STAFF REPORT 50.
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exposure may directly cause death or aggravate pre-existing
respiratory ailments which result in death, 5 and both common

headaches and hypertension have been attributed to various
atmospheric pollutants.6 Carbon dioxide may be responsible for more

insidious effects, such as the impairment of human judgment, to
which has been partially attributed the increased urban automobile
accident rate.7 Some evidence exists that even athletic performance

may be hindered by certain pollutant levels. 8 Moreover, air pollution
corrodes and soils buildings and clothing and reduces property

values. 9 Other damage is also substantial; for example, agricultural
pollution damages have been estimated to exceed 500 million dollars
annually in crop damage alone.10 Additional effects include the

visibility loss resulting from photochemical smog which poses a
serious threat to air and ground navigation. Also, urban climatic

conditions frequently vary from their surrounding environs because of
pollution levels. On a transcontinental scale, it has been theorized that

increased carbon dioxide levels could effect a change in the
temperature of the earth with far reaching, irreversible effects upon
the ice caps and our coastal cities."
The air pollution problem is more complex than the mere
identification and correlation of its diverse causes and effects.

Individual pollutants may, for example, combine and interact
chemically in the atmosphere to form little understood "synergistic"

compounds which are often more damaging than the sum of their
individual parts.' 2 Further, industrial technology is producing new,

more complex forms of pollution at a steadily increasing rate
5. Victims of bronchitis, emphysema, pneumonia, tuberculosis, and asthma are especially
vulnerable to pollution effects. See Cassell 201; STAFF REPORT 50-54.

6. See STAFF

REPORT 55.

7. See Chambers, Risks Versus Costs in Environmental Health, in THE ECONOMICS OF AIR
POLLUTION 51,56 (H. Wolozin ed. 1966).
8. See Wayne, Wehrle & Carroll, Oxidant Air Pollution and Athletic Performance, 199
JA.MA. 901 (1967).
9. See, e.g., Pottock v. Continental Can Co., 42 Del. Ch. 360,211 A.2d 622 (1965); Waschak
v. Moffatt, 173 Pa. Super. 209,96 A.2d 163 (1953), rev'd379 Pa. 441, 109 A.2d 310 (1954).
10. See. e.g., King Farms Co. v. United States Steel Corp., 432 Pa. 140,247 A.2d 563 (1968).
See also Brandt & Heck, Effects ofAir Pollutants on Vegetation, in I AIR POLLUTION 401 (A.

Stern ed., 2d ed. 1968); 1 BNA,

ENVIRONMENT REP.-CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS

445 (1970)

[hereinafter cited as BNA, E.R.].
I1. See Ayres, AirPollutionin Cities,9 NAT. RES. J. 1, 12 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Ayres];
TIME, Feb.2, 1970, at61.
12. See Cassell 199.
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exceeding researchers' ability to analyze and predict the effect upon

the chemistry of the atmosphere.
POLLUTION CONTROL PROGRAMS

Present Control Efforts
Pollution control programs now in effect have generally taken one
of three forms: effluent standards which limit the emittance of specific
forms of pollutants; 13 absolute prohibition of certain polluting
activities such as the burning of low-grade coal; 4 and controls on

certain pollution-causing activities such as stack height regulations
and boiler specifications for power plants. 15 These abatement schemes

have been unsuccessful partially because of the type of enforcing
agency and the nature of the control program." Experience under

these programs has shown that legislatures too often yield to the
pressures of local industrial polluters who represent substantial
7
percentages of revenues and employment for their constituents.1

Moreover, state and local legislatures fear making their areas
unattractive to industrial growth because of strict pollution
regulations."
Although air pollution complexity militates against structuring

controls toward individual pollution components and indicates a need
for industry-wide coverage,19 present legislative attempts in the form
13. See, e.g., New Jersey Air Pollution Control Code, ch. 7, § 2 (1964), reprintedin, PUBLIC
HEALTH SERVICE,

A

COMPILATION OF SELECTED AIR POLLUTION EMISSION CONTROL

57 (1968) [hereinafter cited as COMPILATION].
14. See, e.g., Rules and Regulations of the Pollution District of Orange County, Calif., Rule
26 (1955), reprintedin, COMPILATION 43.
15. See, e.g., Allegheny County, Pa. Smoke Control Ordinance § 1308 (1960), reprintedin,
COMPILATION 7.
REGULATIONS AND ORDINANCES

16. See Esposito, Air and Water Pollution: What to do While Wailing for Washington. 5

CIw. RIGHTS-CIV. Lw. L. REV. 32, 42-43 (1970). The expenditures of state and local
agencies in controlling pollution reflect the lack of substantial commitment. See O'Fallon,
Deficienciesin the Air QualityAct of 1967,33 LAW &CONTEMP. PROB. 275,293-96 (1968).
17. See Green, State Control of Interstate Air Pollution, 33 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 315,
330 (1968). An indication of the economic coercion an industry can have over individual voters
is illustrated in note 218 infra.
18. See, e.g., The Evening Bulletin (Philadelphia), Feb. II, 1970, § B, at 20, col. 1. Often,
potentially effective legislation is not diligently enforced against local industry by the
governmental agency. Without federal control, the effluent fee administration would also be
required to control this adverse motivation. The problem is only partially solved by the Air
Quality Act. See O'Fallon, supra note 16, at 285. See note 121 infra.
19. Cassell 197. These factors also impede the utilization of technological advances to keep
pace with the evolving pollution problem.
HARV.
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of effluent standards are unrealistically directed at singular
pollutants. Also, and perhaps most important, insufficient knowledge

concerning pollutants and their synergistic effects makes the
ascertainment of the emitter's cost-saving function and the receptor's
damage function 20 extremely difficult. The lack of an optimum

effluent standard causes a waste of economic resources. 21 Moreover,
current static effluent standards fail to provide an economic incentive
to the polluter to develop or install more effective abatement
equipment beyond that required by the standard. The polluter,
restricted to one abatement level is presented with no alternative

which may be more appropriate in view of his cost function. This
results in economic waste since more abatement resources are

expended than justified by the public benefit derived therefrom.2

Despite the apparent drawbacks to the direct regulation of air
polluters through fixed standards,2 the federal government appears to
be moving toward the establishment of national effluent standards as
indicated by the recent Senate passage of the National Air Quality

Standards Act of 1970,? which provides for establishment of such
standards for particularly dangerous pollutants by the Department of

Health, Education and Welfare.
20. These two functions will hereinafter be referred to as the cost-benefit relationship.
21. See FIRST REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF HEW TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS,
PROGRESS IN THE PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF AIR POLLUTION, S. Doc. No. 92,90th Cong.,
2d Sess. 65 (1968) [hereinafter cited as FIRST REPORT]; Cassell 198-200.
22. Management's view toward this misallocation was well summarized by an industrial
engineer.
It is most disturbing to us in industry who are technically oriented to see overly simplified
regulations adopted. This type regulation can fail because the control cost may be very
great and not commensurate with the benefit derived. . . . In the final analysis, it is the
public who pays the cost of pollution control. Address by W. Chalker, "Industrial
Problems and Solutions-Chemical,' Symposium on Air Pollution, N.C. State Univ.,
Raleigh, N.C., Sept. 26, 1968.
The above mentioned drawbacks to the effluent standard approach are all removed by
combining it with an effluent fee schedule. However, the technical lag problem still remains. See
notes 81-87 infra and accompanying text.
23. The advantages of the direct regulation approach are summarized in Hagevik, Legislating
for Air Quality Management. Reducing Theory to Practice,33 LAw & CONTEMP, PROD. 369,
378 (1968).
24. 116 CONG. REC. 16,260 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1970). The bill is presently in conference
committee. [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] 2 CONG. INDEX, House Status Table, 4932 (1970). See
also SENATE COMMrrTEE ON PUBLIC WORKS, AIR QUALITY ACT OF 1967, S. REP. No. 403,90th
Cong., Ist Sess. 5 (1967) [hereinafter referred to as SENATE REPORT].
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Alternatives

Tax Credit. Several alternatives to direct regulation of polluters,
most offering an economic incentive to abate, have been proposed.
One alternative provides tax creditsl for capital investment in air
pollution abatement facilities and accelerated depreciation for such
equipment. In addition to the problem of ascertaining the portion of a

26
plant's investment which should be allocated to pollution control,

the credit may encourage capital expenditure for abatement

equipment when a lower cost alternative solution is available?27 The
basic thrust of this approach is misguided since abatement costs are
shifted to the government and ultimately the taxpayer rather than the
polluter. Further, the proportion of control cost attributable to such
equipment is generally low, reducing the abatement incentive provided
by the credit." Tax incentives also provide a distinct advantage to
firms subject to higher corporate income tax rates. The Tax Reform
Act of 1969 has partially implemented this alternative by providing
rapid amortization of a portion of the adjusted basis of "pollution

control" facilities."
Subsidization. Another alternative to direct control is to
subsidize the polluter for reducing his effluent emissions.3 Initially,

such a program may seem inequitable because the public pays for
reducing pollution when, in reality, the cost of abatement should very

likely be a cost of the polluter's production."1 In addition, the
25. See Gerhardt, Incentives to Air Pollution Control, 33 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 361
(1968). The investment credit provided under section 48 of the INT. REv. CODE of 1954 has been
suspended under the Tax Reform Act of 1969, § 401 (e), 83 Stat. 487. A comprehensive analysis
of the tax incentive approach is found in Roberts, River BasinAuthorities:A NationalSolution
to Water Pollution,83 HARV. L. REv. 1527, 1530-37 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Roberts].
26. This problem would arise, for instance, where a more efficient boiler is purchased which
emits fewer air contaminants. The entire cost of the boiler should not be accorded special tax
treatment. See Gerhardt, supra note 25, at 361-62.
27. The polluter may install expensive abatement equipment to gain the tax advantage rather
than use less contaminating fuels, a possibly cheaper alternative. Economic waste is thus
encouraged. See id. at 362-63; Roberts 1533.
28. See Gerhardt, supra note 25, at 366; Mills, Economic Incentives in Air Pollution
Control, in THE ECONOMICS OF AIR POLLUTION 40,46 (Wolozin ed. 1966) [hereinafter cited as
Mills].
29. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 169. The Act, by allowing the credit only for a "new,
identifiable treatment facility," would also discourage the use of alternative, cheaper abatement
techniques such as fuel substitution or installation of more efficient abatement processes.
30. See Mills, 42-46; Mills, FederalFiscal Policy in Air Pollution Control PROCEEDINGS:
THE THIRD NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON AIR POLLUTION 574, 576 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
PROCEEDINGS].

31. Requiring the polluter to absorb pollution costs may not be as equitable as it initially

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1970:943

uncertain pollution "origin" for such payments causes difficulties in
ascertaining accurate subsidies for the installation of process-

modification equipment which reduces pollution yet increases plant
2
3

efficiency.

PrivateA ction. A third alternative is the private civil action to
enjoin or to collect damages from offending polluters.3 This method
is more flexible since the pollutant recipient can direct his action

against new, complex pollutants. Moreover, the receptor may obtain
immediate relief rather than await the promulgation and

implementation of effective pollution legislation. u The class action
offers the private plaintiff an even more effective anti-pollution

weapon.35 The use of such nuisance actions in the past, however, has
been sporadic and ineffective u because of trial delays, problems of

proof,37 excessive costs, and lack of precedent.3 The formation of
environmental ligitation groups 39 and the ineffectiveness of present
pollution legislation40 are presently placing greater emphasis on

private remedies. This trend will likely continue, and although the
appears. Consider the land use conflict that arises when A purchases land adjacent to a pulp mill
operated by B. A has deliberately caused the ensuing conflict, and ifA forces B to relocate, he is
imposing an external diseconomy on A. This situation suggests that costs should be distributed
between the receptor and emitter to best approximate an optimum allocation of resources,
although this ideal is only approachable in private nuisance litigation. See Note, An Economic
Analysis of Land Use Conflicts, 21 STAN. L. REV. 293 (1969).
32. An incentive would exist for the industry to build a plant with a higher emission level to
utilize fully the subsidy. The industry would thus be setting its own "origin" for the payments.
See Mills 45.
33. See, e.g.. Arvidson v. Reynolds Metals Co., 125 F. Supp. 481 (W.D. Wash. 1954). See
MAINTENANCE OF ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES section of text infra for an analysis of the effect of the
effluent fee scheme upon private remedies.
34. See generally Esposito, supra note 16.
35. See note 273 infra.
36. See Edelman, Air Pollution Control Legislation, in 3 AIR POLLUTION 553, 554-55 (A.
Stern ed., 2d ed. 1%8).
37. The formidable nature of this obstacle is exemplifed in Heck v. Beryllium Corp., 424 Pa.
140, 226 A.2d 87 (1966), where the difficulty in proving the causal relationship between the only
beryllium plant in the area and berylliosis resulted in the reversals of two jury verdicts.
38. See Juergensmeyer, Control ofAir Pollution Through the Assertion of PrivateRights.
1967 DUKE LJ. 1126, 1130-37. The Restatement rule requires an element of intent and the
presence of an ultra-hazardous activity, further impeding recovery in private nuisance actions.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 520,822 (1939).
39. The Environmental Defense Fund, Inc., Wilderness Society, National Environmental
Law Societies, Sierra Club, and groups formed to combat specific problems such as the Scenic
Hudson Preservation Conference have spearheaded the litigation effort. Cf. note 276 infra.
40. See note 121 infra.
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courts are not endowed with the ability to regulate, control, and police
air pollution sources, such remedies effectively complement other
control measures.
Effluent Fee Proposal
The effluent fee scheme, an effective alternative to direct control,
has a solid theoretical basis and answers many of the problems posed
by the other control schemes. Basically, without an air quality
management program, air is considered an external diseconomy; 41
that is, the costs of the discharge of pollutants into the air are imposed
upon receptors rather than being borne by the source of the
pollutants. This misallocation results from a failure of the market
mechanism to allocate effectively the air resource thus imposing no
restraint upon the polluter. The effluent fee scheme seeks to minimize
both the costs of pollution damage and abatement expenses by
requiring the polluter to pay a fee reflective of abatement costs. The
fee increases to the point where additional abatement expenditures
would exceed the benefit provided to others by the increased
abatement. This optimal point is determined at any given time by first
ascertaining the receptor's effluent damage function which represents
potential public benefit from abatement. The cost function of the
polluter to institute an abatement program is then determined; the
optimal pollution level is that point where the marginal effluent
damage equals the marginal abatement cost. 2 It is this level of
41. See A. PIGOu, THE

ECONOMICS OF WELFARE

160-61 (1932).

42. See Wright, Some Aspects of the Use of Corrective Taxes for ControllingAir Pollution

Emissions. 9 NAT.

RES.

J. 63,64-66 (1969). The optimum pollution emission level is illustrated

below.
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pollution which the effluent fee scheme is designed to reach, relying on
the profit-maximization motive of the polluter to encourage efficient

pollution reduction rather than payment of the fee. Although this
profit maximization postulate has been questioned, alternative
43
economic rationales could yield even greater benefits.

Advantages. The principal advantage of the effluent fee scheme

is that it approaches the optimum level of pollution abatement by the
method least costly to society. Contrary to most forms of direct
enforcement, the fee provides a continuing incentive to the polluter to

install pollution equipment or to develop more efficient abatement
systems." The polluter who finds such installation costs greater than

the fee will pay the fee until such time as less costly abatement means
are developed. Other firms will abate rather than pay the fee if that is
the least costly alternative or partially abate and pay a lower effluent
fee. In any case, pollution costs become a cost of production borne by
the firm or the consumer rather than the public generally, thus

"internalizing" the previously external costs.' s
This internalization would greatly encourage the development of a

comprehensive and advanced pollution control industry. Polluting
organizations would be economically justified, as would their
The abscissa represents the emission rate, and the ordinate represents the marginal reduction in
damage costs (increment to total reduction in damages) arid the marginal cost of control
(increment to total control costs). The optimum emission level, Po, is that point where the
marginal cost of control equals the marginal reduction in damage costs. An increment of con'trol
above P0 would result in an increase in cost outweighing the increase in the value of damage
control, causing total costs, control plus damage, to rise. Likewise at control levels below Po,
overall costs could be reduced by increasing control efforts to the optimum level, Po. The graph
assumes that the unrestrained emission rate (Pm)obtains where the marginal reduction in
damage costs is zero and that both marginal cost of control and marginal reduction in damage
costs functions are positive and linear. See Kneese, How Much is Air PollutionCosting Us In
the UnitedStates?, PROcEEDINGS 529,530-31.
43. The effluent fee scheme assumes that the entrepreneur-will respond in a rational manner
as a profit.maximizing individual. It has been suggested that this microeconomic neoclassical
theory of distribution should be replaced by a sociological interpretation of the firm as an
organization within the general social system. Wolozin, Discussion, PROCEEDINGS 580. Given
this decision-making model, air pollution abatement may be even greater than that anticipated
under the classical model in view of management's social responsibilities. Hagevik, supra note
23, at 373.
44. An additional research incentive may be provided by emission standards if the standard
imposed is couched in terms so that it must be reached by a predetermined date. But even then, if
technology were still lacking by that date, a variance could usually be obtained. See notes 249253 infra and accompanying text.
45. See Crocker, The Structuringof Atmospheric ControlSystems, in THE ECONOMICS OF
AIR POLLUTION 61 (H. Wolozin ed. 1966). Total internalization, however, is not possible. See
note 31 supra.

YVol. 1970.943]

AIR POLLUTION CONTROL

competitors, in providing funds for abatement research. Such
incentive is of critical importance to the pollution control industry
whose limited sales have justified only relatively low research and
development expenditures."
A further result of internalization would be an adjustment by the
consumer to price differentials created by fee assessments. Depending
on the ability of the polluter to reflect the fee in the price of his
product, the demand for a good produced with a minimal fee may
likely increase at the expense of a substitutable good requiring a high
fee. This market reallocation would result in a lower total pollution
emittance.
Another advantage involves the determination of the least cost
solution for a particular polluter which entails a complex evaluation
of possible technological process changes and available effluent
treatment alternatives. The effluent fee scheme places this abatement
analysis burden on corporate management, where it belongs, rather
than on government officials. Corporate personnel, with intimate
knowledge of their particular firm's manufacturing processes, are in a
superior position to ascertain their most efficient abatement
programs. The implementation of their abatement decision may take
either of two forms-symptomatic treatment or process change. 7 The
symptomatic treatment-employment of particulate and gas
removing devices-is less desirable than process changes, such as fuel
substitution, since the former usually results in other waste
problems." Since process changes may require long periods to plan
and complete, the effluent fee scheme advantageously allows the
polluter to pay the fee during the transition period instead of requiring
him to abate immediately, resulting in a waste of economic resources,
or seek a variance.4
Effluent fees are adjustable to the time of day, season, weather, or
economic change to reflect more accurately the pollution damage
function. The entire schedule may be modified to meet the constant
evolution of complex pollutants and their possible synergistic effects.0
46. Esposito, supra note 16, at 34-35.
47. See Ayres 21.
48. Electrostatic precipitators, for example, create a solid waste disposal problem while wet
scrubbers necessitate polluted water treatment.
49. See notes 249-53 infra and accompanying text.
50. See note 19 supra and accompanying text. The difficulty in measuring the pollution
damage function may greatly impede such adjustments. The effluent standard-fee approach
avoids this obstacle. See note 86 infra and accompanying text.
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Sharing fee revenues with local communities who oppose stringent
pollution measures because of fears of industrial unattractiveness may
elicit political support for the program. Local governments could
disseminate the funds to pollution-related activities such as abatement
research, respiratory disease research and treatment, or health effects
studies.5' Alternatively, the revenue could enlarge general funds,52 thus
relieving the citizen's general tax burden.s Either proposal should
appear attractive to the receptor-taxpayer.
Objections. The difficulty in determining the damage caused by
particular pollutants presents the most formidable objection to the
effluent fee scheme, an objection with legal implications." Past
attempts at such a calculation have been condemned as inaccurate
and raise some questions concerning whether such costs can be
measured.15 Basically, two types of social damage' must be
computed: direct costs such as cleaning and health damage and
indirect costs such as employment adjustments. The diverse nature of
the components increases the difficulty of placing a dollar figure upon

such losses. One possibility is to measure property value variations in
exposed areas.5 7 The flaw in this method, however, is purchaser
ignorance of the more insidious effects of long range pollution
exposure. 58 Despite its apparent drawbacks, the property value
51. The Wdvisability of earmarking the funds for these purposes, however, has been seriously
questioned. SeeTAx FOUNDATION, EARMARKED STATE TAXES 18-21 (1955).
52. A logical alternative would be to allow compensation to those citizens who could prove
pollution-related injuries. The obvious impracticality of such a system precludes its
consideration.
53. Revenue resulting from an effluent fee scheme employed to control water pollution,
however, would be utilized to establish large treatment plants. In this respect, application of the
effluent fee scheme to water pollution is more functional than its application to air pollution.
54. See notes 233-37 infira and accompanying text.
55. See Kneese, How Much is Air Pollution Costing Us in the United States?, PROCEEDiNOS
529. The unique difficulties in measuring health effects are discussed in Cassell 198-201. These
difficulties, however, may not prove insurmountable. See Lave & Seskin, Air Pollution and
Human Health, 169 SCIENCE 723 (1970).
56. SeeAyres 15-16.
57. See Ridker, Strategies for Measuring the Costs ofA ir Pollution, in THE ECONOMICS OF
AIR POLLUTION 87, 97, (H. Wolozin ed., 1966). A recent comprehensive study conducted in
St. Louis, Washington, D.C., and Kansas City correlated air quality decrease to property
value decrease. The factor developed from this study was then applied to each city in the
nation to obtain the national damage figure, which approached 620 million dollars. FORTUNE,
Feb., 1970, at 122-23.
58. The method does show promise as an indicator of at least a significant portion of
pollution-related damages. Other difficulties include distinguishing non-pollution factors which
result in variations in the property value and assuring that the values represent an equilibrium
condition.See FORTUNE, Feb., 1970, at 122-23.
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parameter may be the only practical damage indicator, but a

comprehensive national study would require a concerted, wellfinanced effort. Another proposal suggests that sophisticated polling

techniques be utilized to determine how much compensation a
receptor will require to forego asserting his rights to pollution
abatement.5 Limited data, high costs, and sheer magnitude militate

against such a project. Furthermore, the receptor might overstate his
need for clean air. 6" Certain damage components, such as "socialinteraction" effects of individual relocation and costs masked by
informational deficiencies, cannot be determined by either this or the

property value method. Another factor complicating damage
determination is the synergistic effect of atmospheric pollutants,

which, along with meteorological variables, creates difficulties in
determining damages for specific types and amounts of effluent.
When such interaction occurs, speculative damage predictions of
effluent effects on an airshed" l produce an optimum abatement level
which is less accurate than desirable. 2 Other impediments to damage

determination include the inability to measure undetected, chronic
health effects;' n difficulty in isolating air pollution damage from other

types of damages;u and difficulty in ascertaining diffusion patterns
from point sources.
An alleged weakness of the effluent fee scheme concerns a firm's
ability to pass the fee to its consumers, thereby arguably eliminating
the incentive to abate. It is not certain, however, that the consumer
59. See id. at 92; cf. Ayres 17-18. The receptor's response would directly depend upon his
income level. The marginal rate of substitution of clean air, that is, the rate at which individuals
are willing to trade a good for clean air, would be quite low in a ghetto neighborhood yet likely
much higher in middle to upperclass areas. See P. SAMUELSON, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS 43 (1965). Another possible investigatory technique utilizing court-determined
damages in civil actions against polluters to reflect pollution-related damages has recently been
considered by the National Air Pollution Control Administration under the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare. The method has some promise, although a study conducted in
the Philadelphia area indicated that the dearth of such actions would at this time undermine such
an effort. See Dillow & Havighurst, A Survey of Air Pollution Litigation in the Philadelphia
Area, Final Report by Duke University to NAPCA (mimeographed, 1969).
60. See Crocker, supra note 1, at 241 n.5.
61. An airshed is that geographical area which encompasses the pollution effects of sources
within it.
62. Consider the curves in noie42 supra. Difficulty in predicting synergistic effects may cause
the marginal damage function to vary from its true shape, thus placing P0 , the optimum
pollution level, at a point above or below its true value.
63. See generally Cassell.
64. In the health effects area, for example, what portion of a cigarette smoker's lungs are
damaged by particulates in the air and what portion by cigarette smoke?
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would bear the entire burden of the fee cost. Economists disagree on
the similar issue of whether the corporate income tax is shifted from
the corporation to the consumer or employee. 5 The disproportionate
ratio of fee to sales of various industries because of rural-urban costbenefit discrepancies" may make exact shifting impossible in the
short run. Decreased predictability of competitors' reactions also
lessens the likelihood of price increases . 7 The example cited most
often by fee opponents, the public utility, is not necessarily devoid of
at least a short range abatement incentive." In some circumstances
regulatory lag, despite the industry's guaranteed rate of return, would
permit realization of profits where cost savings not anticipated at the
time of rate setting are accomplished. 9 Even the monopolist who has
already maximized profits would be inclined to absorb and minimize
the fee rather than risk entry by others into his monopolistic market.7
Detection and monitoring problems are said to be implicit in
effluent fee schemes in two forms. First, present primitive monitoring
technology has not produced efficient, low-cost devices to measure all
types of pollutants.7' The lack of any viable standard or device for
objectively measuring all types of odors is an example of this
technological lag. Although remote stack, multi-component
instrument systems capable of measuring several pollutants
concurrently may be ideal, an effective albeit costly monitoring
program could be instituted utilizing present technology. n Second,
the administrative difficulties of inspecting and measuring many
pollution sources are considered insurmountable. 73 This argument
may be answered by the use of a self-monitoring program 7' whereby
65. See Ratchford & Han, The Burden of the Corporate Income Tax, i0 NAT. TAX J. 310
(1957).
66. An incentive may thus be provided new industry to locate in rural areas where low
pollution damage functions exist with concomitant low effluent fees.
67. SeeJ. DUE, GOVERNMENT FINANCE 215-23 (1963).
68. See Mills, supra note 30, at 589.
69. See Hagevik, supra note 23, at 374.
70. See Ratchford &Han, supra note 65, at 313. The extent of fee shifting would be subject to
other variables such as the rate of turnover of equity capital with a higher rate conducive to
greater shifting, the capital structure of the corporation, the degree of profit maximization, the
concentration of the industry, and the rate of interest. Id. at 314-18.
71. See FIRST REPORT 60-63. The Air Quality Act of 1967 calls for accelerated research and
development in this area. 42 U.S.C. § 1857b-l(b)(2) (Supp. IV, 1969).
72. See FIRST REPORT 60; Current Legislation, State Air Pollution Control Legislation, 9
B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 712,734 (1968); FORTUNE, Oct. 1970, at 113.
73. See Wolozin, The Economics ofAir Pollution:CentralProblems, 33 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROH. 227,235 (1968).
74. Reliance on self-reporting is also found in other agencies such as the Federal
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each polluter is required to install a monitoring device and submit
returns periodically to the administrative agency. 75 Accuracy could be

bolstered by imposing criminal sanctions for intentional discrepancies
and by unannounced inspections of monitoring facilities. Major

discrepancies could be discovered by utilizing a system of crosschecks with other firms' returns, and accuracy could be assured by

requiring the certification of measuring devices by an agency
engineer. 76 Such a system would place the burden of monitoring upon

the polluter and relieve the governmental agency of a formidable
policing and inspection function. The cost of administering such a

system would be dependent upon the likelihood of misreporting by the
corporate emitter. As in the administration of the FCC's selfreporting program,7 corporate reliability minimizes the necessity for
extensive inspection programs.
The effluent fee scheme coupled with this self-monitoring aspect is

best suited for stationary pollution sources producing significant
amounts of damaging emittants. Automobile emission control would

not be feasible through the use of an effluent fee at the owner level
since the monitoring of a large number of small mobile sources whose
individual contributions are insignificant would render administration

prohibitive. A fee administered at the manufacturer level would have
difficulty in taking cognizance of potential automobile emittants

under various conditions, necessarily preventing reliance on a costbenefit analysis. 78 Federal automobile legislation 7 has opted for the
Communications Commission which requires the maintaining and reporting, upon F.C.C.
request, of standard radio station program, operating, and maintenance logs. 47
C.F.R. §§ 73.1!1-.116 (1970).
75. Provision for such a system has been made by the Philadelphia City Council.
PHILADELPHIA, PA., AIR MANAGEMENT CODE ch. 3-300, § 3-301 (13) (1969).
76. See SELF MONITORING section of text infra.
77. See note 74 supra.
78. The tax exacted at the manufacturer's level would avoid many administrative and
monitoring problems. A standard tax related to the model of car and its particular discharge
level could be levied on the sale of that car. Several problems inhere in this solution, however.
The tax would not restrict the transfer of used cars, thus requiring five to ten years to affect
substantially the majority of cars on the highway. Also, the tax is unrelated to the number of
miles driven which is the true indicator of the pollution contribution. Mills 48-49. Alternatively,
the tax could be levied upon the driver relative to the type of car and miles driven.
Administrative proble71 s would again be great, however. Id.
79. The Air Quality Act preempts state action in this area with the exception of California
which had enacted legislation prior to the Act. This preemption, however, is limited to new car
legislation, thus leaving used car controls in the hands of stategovernments.42 U S.C. § 1857f6a(a) (Supp. IV, 1969). H.R..17255,91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 202(b)(1) (1970),*as amended by the
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direct approach administered at the manufacturer's level, never
seriously considering any type of fee scheme.sn Small emission sources

such as backyard incinerators or industries with a low volume of
emission would also be more efficiently controlled through direct
regulation than by an effluent fee scheme. In addition, complex and

costly continuous monitoring equipment would only be worthwhile
for pollution sources of significant proportions.
Some may consider that the flexibility inherent in the fee approach
results in unfair treatment of the polluter. Since the fee schedule is

subject to continuous agency revision, industry is unable to plan
comprehensive abatement programs and may be subjected to a rule of
men rather than law. If the program is properly implemented,

however, most Fee schedule modifications would be of minor
significance if an industry maintained necessary flexibility in its
abatement program. Also, administrative controls would help avoid
unjustified or extensive modifications.
NationalStandards
Effluent Standard-Fee Approach. The effluent fee scheme

administered locally is well suited to complement a national emission
or ambient air quality standards program.8 Coupled with an emission
standards program, the effluent fee scheme could function in two
different respects. First, the standard could be considered an upper

limit above which the emitter could not pollute, thereby limiting his
choice to a lower pollution abatement level. This maximum standard
could be set at the highest level of pollution without serious, known

health effects82 and would lend uniformity to abatement programs.
Senate and sent to conference, 116 CONG. REC. 16,260 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1970), [1969-1970
Transfer Binder] 2 CONG. INDEX, House Status Table, at 4932 (1970), further exemplifies
congressional intent to control automobile emissions at the manufacturer's level, giving them
until 1975 to reduce emissions by 90 percent.
80. Automobile emissions are responsible for over one-half of the general pollution problem;
thus, a major portion of emission sources are removed from the ambit of the effluent fee scheme.
See Bayh, A Congressional View of the Problem, PROCEEDINGS 107, 108.
81. See Dales, Land. Water. and Ownership, CAN. J. ECON., Nov. 1968, at 791. Senator
Muskie opposes the promulgation of national standards and emphasizes the need for strictly
local regulation. Muskie, Environmental Jurisdiction in the Congress and the Executive. 22
ME. L. REV. 171, 175 (1970).
The Senate recently passed H.R. 17255, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1970), which authorizes the
Secretary of HEW to promulgate national emission standards. 116 CONG. REc. 16,260 (daily
ed. Sept. 22, 1970). For the progress of the bill see note 79 supra.
82. The ascertainment of such a level may prove difficult. Synergistic effects in addition to
inversion conditions which accumulate even small emissions to dangerous levels complicate the
determination. See Cassell 198-201.
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The fee schedule below this maximum standard could provide a
continuing incentive to abate to a lower emittance level. A more
complete incentive program would be provided by either inflating the
fee schedule relevant to levels above the standard or lowering the
schedule below it. This solution would create a major incentive to
abate to the standard level and a further, less powerful incentive to
abate below that level. Such an effluent fee program," although
attractive in certain of its practical applications, abandons the basic
economic cost-benefit relationship since the polluter bears a charge
more or less than his appropriate damage. The effluent fee scheme,
however, may be required to sacrifice such theoretically sound
principles to achieve practical effectiveness.
A mbient Air Quality Standard-Fee Approach. Alternatively,
national ambient air quality standards-levels of acceptable pollution
applied to an airshed region in contrast to individual emission
standards-could provide an abatement goal upon which to base the
effluent fee schedule." Such a scheme would necessitate predicting the
response of industry to various fee schedules and would likely require
revision when the effects of initial abatement efforts are known.
Both approaches avoid complete reliance on the difficult to ascertain
cost-benefit relation 8 ' but maintain most of the compelling
advantages of the effluent fee scheme: the continuing incentive to
abate, flexibility, assumption of the decision-making role by
industrial management, susceptibility to self-monitoring, and
relatively low administrative costs.87 The political acceptability of the
basic effluent fee concept may also be enhanced by the fee-standard
approach; the definiteness of an air quality goal or the coerciveness of
an emission standard should relieve voters' apprehension of the
effluent fee's total reliance on the profit-maximization postulate.
These standard-fee approaches offer the most practical alternative to
the effluent fee scheme.
83. Hereinafter referred to as the effluent standard-fee approach.
84. See Crocker, supra note 1, at 257-58. Cf. note 121 infra. This scheme will hereinafter be

referred to as the ambient air quality standard-fee approach.
85. See text discussion of flexibility following note 80 supra.
86. The fee schedule under these proposals would be based upon the standard rather than the
cost-benefit relation. However, the determination of the standard itself should be made with this
relation in mind.

87. See Mills 47.
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CHARACTERIZATION OF THE FEE

The effluent fee scheme, whether it relies upon the cost-benefit
relation or national emission or ambient air quality standards, does
not fit precisely into the classical definitiong of a tax, a fine, a license,
or a user charge. The choice of classification is significant since it
carries substantial constitutional'and administrative ramifications.
For example, a fine encounters procedural due process requirements
not faced by a tax, while an exercise of the police power encounters
different constitutional and statutory limitations than that of the
taxing power. Draftsmen of effluent fee legislation should consider
these and other legal incidents of classification before specifically
designating a particular exaction as a property tax, license or
franchise tax, user charge, or fine.s Although the validity of the

effluent fee scheme as an exercise of the police power"' does not depend
on any such characterization, the proclivity of the courts to so
designate fees necessitates some legislative label.
Property Tax
A discussion of the fee as a property tax necessarily requires
defining the property rights involved. The right to use the air belongs

to the public or private receptor.w Lord Coke's view of the fee simple
absolute as extending "from Heaven to Hell"'" has been modified by

air flight nuisance actions limiting ownership to actual or potential
use of the air space.92 A necessary incident of a property tax is
88. Courts generally consider such legislative denominations of great importance to a fee
characterization issue. See County Comm'rs v. English, 182 Md. 514, 531, 35 A.2d 135, 143
(1943); Ingels v. Riley, 5 Cal. 2d 154, 160,53 P.2d 939,942 (1936).
89. See PolicePower subsection of text infra.
90. This definition of property rights appears to lend itself to efficient market allocation of
the air resource, see Crocker, supra note I, at 245, but for reasons discussed previously, it does
not. See notes 1-2 supra and accompanying text.
91. 1 E. COKE, INSTITUTE OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND § 4a (16th ed. 1809). See W. PROSSER,
THE LAW OF TORTS 70 (3d ed. 1964).
92. See W. PROSSER, supra note 91, at 70; Klein, Cujus Est Solum Ejus Est-Quousque
Tandem?, 26 J. AIR LAW & COMM. 237 (1959). Four theories of air ownership have been
espoused by various state courts. One view gives the owner the space essential to complete use of
his land. See Smith v. New England Aircraft Co., 270 Mass. 511, 170 N.E. 385 (1930). Another
approach limits ownership to that actually used. Hunter, The Conflicting Interests of Airport
Owner & Nearby Property Owner, 11 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoB. 539, 547 (1945). The
Restatement recognizes unlimited ownership of air subject to the privilege of air flight.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 159 (1965). A fourth view gives an action in nuisance for
interference with actual use of the land. See Hyde v. Somerset Air Service, I N.J. Super. 346, 61
A.2d 645 (1948). The polluter, regardless of the period of his unprotested invasion of the public
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assessment based on value rather than use, 93 while the effluent fee

taxes the use of public and private air space, not the space itself. More
specifically, the effluent fee is a function of the type and volume of

emittance, not the value of real property. The ad valorem tax
designation is best avoided since the effluent fee schedule, with varying

cost-benefit relations in different areas, may not attain the degree of
uniformity required by state constitutional standards 95 and would
encounter rate ceilings" and public body tax exemption provisions.9
License Tax

The license or franchise tax,98 often motivated by public health or
safety considerations, 9 generally results in the granting of a privilege
by the sovereign to the taxpayer, and the effluent fee scheme satisfies

this general definition. The license fee rather than the license tax
designation would be more appropriate since the exaction is largely

regulatory in nature, seeking to deter pollution rather than to collect
revenue.100 The taxpayer under the license concept is granted the

privilege of operating his plant at a certain emittance level. Opponents
air space, cannot gain a prescriptive right against the public to pollute when a public nuisance is
involved. Corsicana v. King, 3 S.W.2d 857,861 (rex. Civ. App. 1928).
As to the receptor's air space, a prescriptive right is doubtful where each pollution episode is
deemed a new offense. Northwestern Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659,669 (1878).
93. See Powell v. Gleason, 50 Ariz. 542,74 P.2d 47 (1937); In reCity of Enid, 195 Okla. 365,
158 P.2d 348 (1945).
94. The polluter is being taxed not as an incident to the use of his own property but relative to
the damage his pollution causes to the receptors.
I. The license and
95. See. e.g., ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 1;N.J. CONsT. art. VIII, § I,
franchise dcsignation may also encounter uniformity requirements in some states. See, e.g., Mo.
CoNsT. art. X, § 3. Airsheds could likely be subjected to different treatment under these
statutes, however, by invoking the legislative power of classification. The reasonableness of such
a classification is discussed in notes 264-66 infra and accompanying text.

96. SeeJ.

HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION

141 (3rd ed. 1969).

97. See, e.g., NJ. STAT. ANN. § 55:14A-20 (1964). Either constitutional amendment or
specific statutory provision would have to be applied in these jurisdictions.
98. Such a tax would fall under the general classification of excise taxes. Although several
states consider a license as granting an otherwise illegal right and a franchise as sanctioning a
preexisting right, this distinction has doubtful validity. See Madden v. Queens County Jockey
Club, 296 N.Y. 249,22 N.E.2d 697 (1947).
99. See Conard v. State, 41 Del. 107, 16 A.2d 121, 125 (Super. Ct. 1940); Pennsylvania
Liquor Control Bd. v. Publicker Commercial Alcohol Co., 347 Pa. 555,559-60, 32 A.2d 914,
917 (1943).
100. The Revised Model State Administrative Procedure Act makes this distinction clear.
"'[L]icense' . . . does not include a license required solely for revenue purposes . ..."
REVISED MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT § 1(3) (1961) [hereinafter cited as
MODEL ACT].
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of the effluent fee scheme label it a "license to pollute."'' This
designation suggests the preclusion of all private or public actions
against the polluter, considering the fee as the purchase of a privilege
to damage the public. Such a reaction is inaccurate since private
remedies are not preempted by the fee scheme.0 2 Nevertheless, the
term "license" does connote pTeemption of private and public
remedies against the polluter. The license concept also conceals the
scheme's basic purposes of encouraging abatement and optimally
allocating air resources. Since total abatement is often demanded
by the public,' the license designation could prove politically fatal
to the entire fee scheme.
User Charge
Viewing the fee as an assessment for the injurious use of public air
space as a pollutant receptacle invites greater public acceptance. Such
a designation avoids the political disadvantages of the license tax,
encounters few specific statutory limitations, and does not infringe
private remedies.0 4 The user charge, analogous to sewer use charges,
is generally distinguished from a tax and thus avoids public body
exemption statutes.104 It can also be contrasted with special property
assessments for public financed improvements which invoke specific
procedural requirements in many jurisdictions. 0 The user charge is
based upon the use of public property, not the furnishing of a direct
improvement to private property. This classification may present the
closest approximation to the effluent fee even though viewing the air
space as a rentable commodity is somewhat strained. 7
101. Senator Edmund Muskie used this term to describe the effluent fee approach in a speech
to the University of North Carolina Environment Symposium, March 17, 1970.
102. See MAINTENANCE OF ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES section of text infra.
103. The misallocation of the air resource which would attend total abatement renders such a
proposal unfeasible. See Crocker, supra note 45, at 65 n.3; Turvey, On Divergences Between
Social andPrivateCosts, ECONOMICA, Aug. 13, 1963, at 309-13.
104. See MAINTENANCE OF ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES section of text infra.
105. See Jersey City Sewerage Authority v. Housing Authority, 40 NJ. 145, 190 A.2d 870
(1963).
106. A close parallel can be drawn to sewer service charges which have been contrasted to
special assessments. See Michelson v. Grand Island, 154 Neb. 654,48 N.W.2d 769 (195 1).
107. The license tax or property tax designations would enable the firm to treat the payment
as a business expense deduction. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 162, 164. This may be counterproductive to the pollution abatement equipment depreciation incentive recently provided by
Congress. Id. § 48(h)(12).
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Fine
Many of the tax limitationsM are avoided by considering the fee a
civil or criminal penalty. The damage aspect of pollution emission
suggests a penalty categorization. 109 The enforcement of a criminal
penalty, however, necessitates the application of an expanding body of
procedures associated with criminal due process. Such procedures are
not needed for pollution offenses; therefore, denomination as a
criminal penalty should be avoided. The civil penalty, enforceable by
administrative agencies " and involving fewer procedural
requirements, is more conducive to the effluent fee approach.
Although state civil penalty law is not entirely clear,' a hearing
would not be required for each penalty assessed since only the
legislative, non-adjudicative facts of the reasonableness of the fee
schedule for the entire airshed would be at issue." 2 Arguably, the civil
penalty payment would not be tax deductible as a business expense
since its basic purpose, to provide an incentive to abate, would thereby
be weakened.113 The civil penalty designation, therefore, avoids the
necessity of federal income tax revision required by the previous
classifications.' The penalty concept, implying penalization of the
polluter for a civil wrong and avoiding a "license to pollute"
characterization, is certainly more politically palatable.
PREEMPTION BY THE AIR QUALITY ACT

The Act
Present pollution control programs have emanated from the Clean
Air Act of 1963 as amended by the Air Quality Act of 1967."1 This
legislation attempts to shape and coordinate federal, state, and local
pollution control efforts. To this end, the 1967 act placed primary
enforcement responsibility at the state level'" but required state
108. See notes 95-97, 102.-03 infra and accompanying text.
109. See, e.g., PHILADELPHIA, PA., AIR MANAGEMENT CODE ch. 3-100, § 3-103(5) (1969).
See also Kovel, A Case for Civil Penalties: Air Pollution Control,46 J. URBAN LAW 153 (1968).
110. Id.
I l. See I K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.20 (1958).
112. See id.
The adjudicative function and the hearing requirement would be encountered in
inspection objections and sanctions and objections to the accuracy of pollution measurements.
113. The expense is not "necessary" if allowance of the deduction would frustrate state
policy. Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958).
114. See note 107 supra and accompanying text.
115. 42 US.C. § 1857 (Supp. IV, 1969), amending 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (1964).

116. Id. § 1857(a)(3).
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cognizance of federal recommendations and research." 7 Basically, the

statute directs the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
(HEW), after having designated air quality control regions
representative of a common air pollution problem,"' to develop air
quality criteria correlating concentrations of particular pollutants
with their effects on health and welfare." 9 In addition, HEW must

develop control techniques to abate specific pollutants for state
consideration.1 0 Each state, within a definite period, must then adopt
ambient air quality standards' consistent with HEW's air quality
criteria for each control region. 22
Once its standards are approved, the state must develop an
effective implementation plan.'2 The state is free to adopt different
plans for each control region or a uniform plan for the entire state,
but if a state fails to act, the Secretary is empowered to establish
appropriate air quality standards. 24 Whenever the ambient air quality
of any control region is below established standards because of an
inadequate or nonexistent enforcement scheme, the Secretary may,
should the pollution endanger other states, bring an abatement action

in federal district court.ss The Secretary may also initiate proceedings
at the request of a state governor if the pollution is of an intrastate
character.'2
117. Id. § 1857b.
118. Id. § 1857c-2.
119. Id. § 1857c-2(b).
120. Id. § 1857c-2(b). Cost benefit studies, monitoring technology, and enforcement and fee
modification techniques should be provided by HEW to the states under this section.
121. These represent air quality goals for the entire airshed as opposed to effluent standards
which are directed at the polluter. Ralph Nader, in "Task Force Report on Air Pollution,"
condemned the federal control efforts:
The Air Quality Act of 1967, central legislation for federal air pollution control, is a
hopeless failure. The Act is responsive to the common industry line that the public must
prove a health hazard before action against pollution.
The ambient air standards approach permits the states and local industries to hide
behind a facade of regulation while no meaningful progress is made. I BNA, E.R.CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 50 (1970).
122. 42 U.S.C. § 1857d(c)(l) (Supp. IV, 1969). These standards are subject to revocation by
the Secretary to the extent that they are inconsistent with the criteria and control data published
by HEW. Id. § 1857d(c)(2). The states are presently behind the legally required timetable. I
BNA, E.R.-CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 272 (1970).
123. 42 U.S.C. § 1857d(c)(4) (Supp. IV, 1969).
124. Id. § 1857d(c)(2).
125. Id. § 1857d(c)(4). These sections may be modified by the proposed National Air
Quality Standards Act of 1970, H.R. 17,255,91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
126. 42 U.S.C. § 1857d(c)(4)ii (Supp. IV, 1969).
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Effluent Fee Scheme Under the Act
The implementation of a state effluent fee abatement scheme
under this statutory framework may encounter some difficulty.

Initially, it is clear that the federal program was intended not to
preempt state and local control of air pollution but to require it. 127 The

federal government maintains some control over local efforts by
reviewing state air quality standards and maintaining jurisdiction
over interstate pollution conditions, but the thrust of the Act, reflected

both in its express provisions and legislative history, indicates a clear
reliance on local pollution control efforts.12s

Although state programs are basic to the federal scheme, a stateinstituted effluent fee system might conflict with several specific

provisions of the Act. State-approved air quality standards must be
implemented within a "reasonable time."' An effluent fee scheme,
however, could conceivably require a much longer period to attain its

air quality goal than alternative measures, such as an emission
standard system. Since the objective of the effluent fee system is an air

pollution level which represents the optimum economic solution for
the particular emitter and the actual decision to abate is placed upon

the corporation itself, the firm may very well choose to pay a higher
fee temporarily until sufficient research and evaluation of available
techniques assure installation of an efficient control unit.' Such
127. The Air Quality Act places the burden of air pollution abatement at the state level and
asserts in section .1857(a)(3) that "the prevention and control of air pollution at its source is the
primary responsibility of the state and local governments... ? This view was restated in the
Environmental Quality Improvement Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-190, § 202(b)(2) (Apr. 3,
1970). Such an approach is consistent with the attitude that pollution is essentially a local
problem best controlled by the political entity closer both to the polluter and the receptor. See
notes 163-64 infra and accompanying text.
128. A Texas court has ruled that the Texas Clean Air Act, which imposes direct regulations
on polluters, was not preempted by the Federal Clean Air Act, 42 US.C. § 1857 (1964).
Houston Compressed Steel v. Texas, I BNA, E.R.-DEcIsloNS 1416 (Tex. Civ. App., June 25,
1970). This appears to be the only ruling on the preemption issue.
129. Air Quality Act of 1967, 42 U.S.C. § 108(c)(1) (Supp. IV, 1969). The House
maintained this requirement in H.R. 17255, a bill to modify the Clean Air Act, but the Senate
version specifically limited the period to three years. H.R. 17255, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
§ I11(a)(2)(A) (1970), as amended by the Senate and sent to conference, 116 CONG. REC.
16,260 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1970), [1969-70 Transfer Binder] 2 CONG. INDEX, House Status
Table, at 4932 (1970). An effluent fee scheme may encounter difficulty in meeting the three year
limitation as well, although a standard-fee approach should not.
130. This delay avoids the economic wastes inherent in an emission standard scheme. There,
the polluter without a variance from the prescribed maximum usually must make the abatement
effort despite informational and technological deficiencies.
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delays could extend the achievement of acceptable pollution levels
beyond a reasonable period. There is some indication, however, that a
flexible approach to the determination of a "reasonable time" was
intended by the Act. The report of the Senate Committee on Public
Works recognized that control methods must be implemented only
"as soon as economically feasible and technologically available,"''
indicating that reasonableness is relative to the system under
consideration. Where significant public health implications are
present, however, HEW requires "attainment of the standard within
the shortest possible time with available control techniques." 3 2 Direct
regulation insures that air quality goals are reached much faster than
the effluent fee or ambient air quality standard-fee schemes.
Temporary interim control measures may be necessary in addition to
these approaches to reduce emissions below a health-damaging
level.ls By imposing a coercive maximum emittance level, the effluent
standard-fee proposal would obviate the need for such measures.
An effluent fee scheme may not fall within the Air Quality Act's
conception of an acceptable state control method. The Committee on
Public Works seemed to envision the emission standard as the
acceptable control mechanism, and its report defined emission control
requirements as "legally enforceable limitations on the amount of
pollution that a single source . . . may discharge into the

atmosphere."'3 Since an effluent fee scheme does not directly limit
the amount of pollution emitted but provides economic incentives to
reduce emission levels, it apparently falls outside the purview of the
committee definition. In addition, the committee rejected a national
emission standard scheme but recognized its usefulness and directed
the Secretary to undertake a two year study of the concept134 The
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 empower the Secretary to
131. See SENATE REPORT 27.
132. See HEW, GUIDELINES
IMPLEMENTATION PLANS

FOR THE DEVELOPMENT

OF AIR QUALITY STANDARDS AND

13 (1969) [hereinafter cited as GUIDELINES].

133. The ascertainment of a nebulous
difficulty in light of present health effects
134. SENATE REPORT 30. The House
"include emission standards applicable

health-damaging emission level itself would encounter
studies. Seegenerally Cassell.
more specifically defined the implementation plan to
to the sources . . . ." AIR QUALITY ACT OF 1967,
HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE 18, H.R. REP. No. 728, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. 18 (1967). HEW interprets the Act as ordinarily requiring emission standards as the
principal element of control strategy. See GUIDELINES § 2.30. The emission standard-fee
approach would appear to satisfy this requirement.
135. 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-6d (Supp. IV, 1969). See SENATE REPORT 36-38.
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establish emission standards for new stationary sources. 3 6 If the

desired movement'37 toward such a scheme as a total control approach
is successful, state-level effluent fee systems would be singularly
inappropriate. The committee and the Act, however, indicated that

minimum national standards in the form of the effluent standard-fee
proposal3 8 are preferable," 9 such a system being not only compatible
with an effluent *fee scheme but highly desirable. The committee's
consideration of a national fee program does not preclude the
emission standard-fee approach. The statutory language of the Act
nowhere defines or limits the concept of control methods and nowhere
specifically prohibits the use of the effluent fee or alternative control

measures. Committee considerations to the contrary would seem to be
4°
outweighed by this unlimiting statutory language.

Even though statutorily authorized, a state effluent fee scheme
would be subject to HEW review and possible rejection and
replacement. The Secretary is empowered to promulgate an
implementation plan in the event a state either fails to file a plan or
submits an unacceptable one.14 1 The Secretary shall base his

evaluation on the following ten criteria: ability to attain the Act's
national standards within three years;1 2 inclusion of measures to

assure the attainment of national standards and goals;" 3 inclusion of
appropriate devices to compile and analyze data and provide it to the

Secretary on request; appropriate zoning and transportation controls;
adequate provision for intergovernmental cooperation;"' periodic
136. H.R. 17255,91stCong.,2dSess. § 114 (1970).
137. The federal government's response indicates that this is indeed the case. John W.
Gardner, then Secretary of HEW, testified to the pressing need for national emission standards.
Hearings on Air Pollution Before the Subcom. on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate
Comm. on Public Works, 90th Cong., IstSess., pt. 2, at 762 (1967). Dr. John T. Middleton,
then Director of the National Center for Air Pollution Control, reiterated the desirability of
such standards. Id.. pt. 3, at 1155-56. See O'Fallon, supra note 16, at 278-83.
138. See note 83 supraand accompanying text.
139. SENATE REPORT 36.
140. The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, H.R. 17255,91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 1 l(a)(1)
(1970), specifically sanction ambient air quality standards more stringent than federal
standards. Thus, if national emission standards are promulgated pursuant to section I10(a)(l)
of the proposed amendments, a state effluent fee program utilizing such standards as a ceiling is
acceptable.
141. Id. § Ill(a)(3)(C).
142. See notes 129-33 supra and accompanying text.
143. The efficacy of the effluent fee approach in this respect has been questioned. See
Questions and Comments, PROCEEDINGS 586-89. CompareWolozin, supranote 43, with Mills,
supra note 30.
144. See notes 149, 150 infra and accompanying text.
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reporting from stationary sources and correlation of such reports with
national standards; 5 assurances of adequate state personnel, funding,
and authority; periodic testing and inspections of motor vehicles;

periodic revision of the plan;'

and identification of the air quality

47
control region to which the plan applies.
Although the prior discussion- has centered upon employing the
effluent fee scheme within the present fedefal statutory framework,
new federal legislation in the area would be preferable. Federal
support of the effluent fee system as an enforcement procedure would
encourage state and local legislation by providing national and local

cost-benefit analyses and advanced methodology. National effluent
standards'

would guarantee minimum abatement levels and provide

for state pollution efforts without removing local flexibility. In
addition, federal legislation could effectively provide for interstate"4
and international 5 0 factors. The federal government should also
145. The self-monitoring proposal would meet this requirement. See SELF-MONITORING
section of text infra.
146. The effluent fee proposal clearly provides this required flexibility. See note 50 supra and
accompanying text.
147. National Air Quality Standards Act of 1970 § I I(a)(2)(J). For the current status of
the Act, see note 79 supra.
148. See note 137 supra. A recent survey indicated that industrial executives also favored
national standards. See FORTUNE, Feb., 1970, at 119.
149. The current statutory framework allows the Secretary to proceed against interstate
polluters and requires the submission of all interstate compacts to him for approval. The
promulgation of national standards, either in the form of emission or ambient air quality
standards, would virtually obviate the necessity of interstate agreements. The utilization of the
effluent fee approach to implement these standards would involve compensation for interstate
pollution damage, possibly in the form of payments to the receiving state. Increased federal
control of the interstate pollutei would be necessitated by the use of the effluent fee scheme
without emission standards.
150. The transboundary pollution problem is particularly serious in the industrial belt along
the Detroit River on the Canadian border. Detrimental health and economic effects have been
found on both sides of the river. INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION REPORT ON POLLUTION OF
THE ATMOSHERE 3-4 (1960). At present, no specific treaty provision obligates either country to
prevent transboundary contaminants, although the fundamental obligation to do so was
recognized in the Trail Smelter Arbitration, 3 U.N.R.I A.A. 1906, 1965 (19384 1). See Jordan,
Recent Developments in InternationalEnvironmentalPollution Control. 15 McGILL L.J. 279,
296 (1969). Contemporaneous to the implementation of a fee scheme, the federal government
could provide by treaty for mutual compensation to citizens showing pollution-related injuries
from transboundary pollution. The fee schedule would then be modified to reflect this adjusted
cost-benefit relationship. International polluters emitting health-endangering contaminants,
however, require a more effective control agency than the present International Joint
Commission. A treaty recognizing nations' mutual obligations and giving the Commission
power to initiate investigations, coordinate research, and supervise enforcement would be
advisable. The present weakness of Canadian federal and local pollution control programs
presents a substantial barrier to the effectiveness of such a proposal. See id. at 300-01.
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continue research and development'51 in monitoring technology and
abatement techniques to facilitate individual polluter response to
effluent fee economic incentives provided by the system.
ADMINISTRATION OF THE EFFLUENT FEE SCHEME

State and Local Control

Local Advantages. The effective implementation of an effluent
fee scheme would require an extremely competent administrative

agency broadly based on both the state and federal levels to calculate
and enforce accurate fee assessments. Such an agency must initially
determine the cost-benefit relation for all pollutants within its

geographical jurisdiction.1 2 The state may not be the governmental
entity best able to administer such an extensive control program, and

past experience with control efforts at various governmental levels
substantiates this view.'5 Local governments more cognizant of the

problems of both the urban dweller and polluter are better suited to
enforce an effluent fee scheme.15 The consideration of meteorology,

topography, population distribution, industrial type and location, and
similar factors necessary to the cost-benefit relation should be done
by the entity closest to the problem. Continuous monitoring,

inspection, and reporting are also more adaptable to local
capabilities.
Conflict of Interest. Both local and state political bodies
experience a conflict between their desire to protect public health and

economic realities. Stringent pollution laws may force existing
151. See Air Quality Act of 1967,42 U.S.C. § 1857b,b-l,c-2(b),f-6d,j-I (Supp.IV, 1969).
152. Diffusion models would be required to simulate the distribution of,pollutants in given
areas. See FIRST REPORT 65. Extensive cost-benefit studies utilizing ldnd value analyses,
personal interviews, or more innovative techniques would be required. See notes 54-64 supra and
accompanying text. Self-monitoring equipment inspection, certification, and installation would
be necessary in addition to periodic data collection and continuous supervision. Once the scheme
is operative, the schedules must be revised to accommodate meteorological and seasonal
changes.
153. National Center for Air Pollution Control statistics revealed that as of May, 1967, the
average expenditure was 4.8 cents per capita for the thirty-three states which had control
programs while that of the 107 local agencies amounted to 27.9 cents. Hearings on Air
Pollution-1967 (Air Quality A ci) Before the Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the
Senate Comm. on Public Works, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 1160-1283 (1967). See
O'Fallon, supra note 16, at 287-88. Former HEW Secretary Gardner justifiably concluded that
this state response to the Clean Air Act of 1963 was disappointing. Gardner, KeynoteAddress:
ControlNow for CleanA ir, PROCEEDINGS 13-14.
154. See Locher, The Case for a Local or Regional Air Pollution Control Program,
PROCEEDINGS

400,403; FIRST REPORT 35.
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industries to seek more favorable jurisdictions1 5 and reduce an area's
attractiveness to new industry. State and local legislatures may be so
dominated by local industrial groups to make effective pollution
enforcement impossible. The resulting inconsistent state pollution
laws create problems' 5 6 apparently insolvable by interstate
compacts. 157
National-Local Cooperation. These considerations indicate the
desirability of national legislation emphasizing local
administration. 158 The Air Quality Act,'5" however, delegates air
pollution control responsibilities to state agencies. Assuming that an
effluent fee scheme can be implemented under this Act,6 0 state
legislatures must be held responsible for enabling legislation and must
closely supervise control efforts. " ' This comment assumes the existing
enforcement framework available under the Air Quality Act although
specific federal legislation encouraging state administrative delegation
2
to the local level would be preferable."
Local Versus A irshedApp roach
City or county governments or special pollution districts, possibly
conforming to airshed characteristics, may be utilized to administer
state control schemes. City or county administrative agencies possess
the advantages of present existence, prior experience in solving similar
urban problems, potential responsiveness to local voters," 3 and
proximity to the pollution source. Special airshed districts would be
155. See note 18 supra.
156. Interstate pollution from a source in a less restrictive jurisdiction imposes damage
beyond the local legislature's control. Discrepancies between control programs may encourage
less than diligent enforcement of the stricter standard to prevent industry migration. See Green,
supra note 17, at 315.
157. Id. at 320-30. A model interstate pollution control act has been proposed. See
Comment, A Model InterstateCompact for the Control ofA ir Pollution,4 HARV. J. LEGIS. 369
(1967).
158. The effluent standard-fee and ambient air standard-fee approaches necessarily entail

such federal legislation. Whatever enforcement structure is utilized, a critical shortage of trained
administrators, engineers, inspectors, and abatement machinery operators must be faced.
NAPCA is attempting to rectify this problem. I BNA, E.R.-CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 274
(1970).
159. 42 U.S.C. § 1857d(c)(4) (Supp. IV, 1969).
160. See Effluent Fee Scheme Under the Act section of text supra concerning whether the Act

precludes such a scheme.
161. See Local Advantages subsection of text supra.
162. See notes 148-151 supra and accompanying text.
163. The urban entity is, however, also more responsive to industrial pressure.
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larger than city or county lines, and would encompass the pollution
effects created by pollution sources within them. Such an approach
avoids inter-jurisdictional conflicts'" and defines the area which must
be utilized for cost-benefit studies. The independent nature of the
special district renders it less susceptible to pressure from local
interest groups and large industrial concerns."' A state should
carefully evaluate its susceptibility to airshed division and the
effectiveness of its existing urban governments before adopting an
enforcement plan.
DelegationLimitations
Whether the city, county, or special district is the state
enforcement unit, enabling legislation is required to delegate to the
agency adequate power to administer a fee scheme effectively. The
agency must be authorized to promulgate the initial fee schedule and
to effectuate revisions when the cost-benefit relation changes. This
element of schedule discretion would not be eliminated by employing
an effluent standard or an ambient air quality standard in conjunction
with the fee. The fee schedule would still be prepared by the agency
based upon such standards and, in the case of the ambient air quality
standard, revised until the desired air quality is reached." Such a
discretionary delegation tends to usurp the legislative function and
must satisfy state constitutional limitations. State courts have
generally allowed a delegation of power involving the promulgation of
rules and extensive agency discretion only when the enabling
legislation declares a specific legislative policy and establishes
primary standards for enforcing that policy. 67 A greater latitude of
164. The Bay Area Pollution Control District, CAL. HEALTH &SAFETY CODE § 24346.1, .2
(West 1967), exemplifies the airshed approach. The permanent temperature inversion layer in
the San Francisco Bay Area, among other factors, called for an inter-jurisdictional control
authority with representation from the cities and counties within the airshed region. Th,: airshed
boundaries would generally not conform to state boundaries; thus, the dual state district could
create jurisdictional problems.
165. Such autonomy, however, may be viewed as a disadvantage since independent agencies
become difficult to control.
Multiple responsibility to several state governments often means that no one overseer
carefully scrutinizes the actions of the agency. In the past, this has led to agency empire
building-the agency becomes more concerned with its own prestige and effectiveness
narrowly conceived and with the financial interests of its bondholders than with the
purpose for which it was created. Roberts, River Basin Authorities: A National Solution
to Water Pollution, 83 HARV. L. REa.

1527, 1546 (1970).

166. See note 85 infra and accompanying text.
167. See. e.g., State v. Stoddard, 126 Conn. 623,628, 13 A.2d 586, 588 (1940); Bell Tel. Co.
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discretion, however, has been afforded those powers which entail the

regulation of activities closely associated with public health.," An air
pollution control program, much of which is based upon public health
considerations, would merit this broader delegation limitation.
Further, the quantum of certainty required of agency enforcement
standards is a function of the nature of the subject matter being

regulated, and these guidelines must represent the most definitive
standards feasible."6 Inflexible legislative standards are undesirable
since effluent fee enforcement involves complex cost-benefit analyses

requiring expertise substantially beyond the capabilities of the
legislature.

70

The most definitive legislative guidelines possible

include, among other desirable statutory provisions, instructions as to
techniques to be utilized in the cost-benefit determination; explicit

limitations upon the applicability of the fee-automobiles and lowvolume emitters might be excluded; jurisdictional limits; and
procedural requirements. The nature of the air pollution problem and
the effluent fee scheme defy imposition of more definitive standards.
Home Rule Restriction
State constitutional "home rule" provisions impose a possible

restriction upon air pollution administration.'

The typical home rule

enactment, delegating the power to regulate matters of "purely local

concern" to local governmental units,'7 2 limits state legislative power
by prohibiting the state from legislating concerning such matters or
v. Driscoll,343 Pa. 109,116,21 A.2d912,915 (1941); DavidJeffrey Co. v. Milwaukee, 267 Wis.
559, 590, 66 N.W.2d 362, 379 (1954). This "standards" requirement has been seriously
questioned by commentators and some courts. See, e.g., Statev. Hotel Bar Foods, Inc., 18 N.J.
115, 124, 112 A.2d 726, 731 (1955); F. COOPER, I STATE ADMINISTtATIVE LAW 54-70 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as COOPER].
168. See Len-Law Realty Co. v. Falsey, 141 Conn. 524, 529, 107 A.2d 403, 405 (1954);
Akron & Barberton R.R. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 148 Ohio St. 282, 287-88, 74 N.E.2d 256, 259
(1947); 1 COOPER 63.
169. See City of Lakewood v. Thormyer, 171 Ohio St. 135, 143, 168 N.E.2d 289,296 (1960);
1 COOPER 82. In City of Utica v. Water Pollution Control Bd., 5 N.Y.2d 164, 182 N.Y.S.2d
584, 156 N.E.2d 301 (1959), the court authorized a broad delegation of power to a water
pollution control board, indicating that widely varying conditions within the state made strict
standards impossible.
170. See Caritativo v. Teets, 47 Cal. 2d 304,303 P.2d 339 (1956); 1COOPER 83-84.
171. Legislative home rule provisions do not pose such a restriction. See F. MICIIELMAN &T.
SANDALOW, GOVERNMENT IN URBAN AREAS 349 (1970) [herinafter cited as MICIIELMAN &
SANDALOW]; cf. Utica State Savings Bank v. Village of Oak Park, 279 Mich. 568, 273 N.W.

271 (1937).
172. See, e.g.. CAL. CONsT. art. XI, § 6; COLO. CONsT. art. XX, § 6; OHIO CONST. art. 18,
§§ 3,7.
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declaring that local statutes prevail over a similar state statute already
73
enactedY.
States have considered matters not "local" if the effect of
a decision within a jurisdiction effects others outside its control and

have exempted them from home rule restrictions. 74 Air pollution
respects no political boundaries and clearly satisfies this exception.
The responsibility for control placed by the Air Quality Act upon the

states rather than local agencies 75 supports the inapplicability of the
"merely local" label and the home rule doctrine to air pollution.
Agency Enforcement

The effluent fee administrative agency has three basic functions:
fee determination and modification, including cost-benefit analyses;
self-monitoring regulation and inspection; and fee collection and

dispersion. The fee determination function is the most complex and
vital aspect of the fee scheme and would be facilitated by the

appointment of an advisory council, consisting of representatives of
industry, public utilities, receptors, and others directly affected by the

fee determination.

7

The council would have no rule-making power

but could provide a useful liaison with the public by cooperating in

data collection for cost-benefit studies, providing a sounding board
for industrial problems in self-monitoring implementation, and, in the
case of the effluent fee-standard approach, -indicating probable
industrial reaction to different fee schedules.'7
Since fee setting is a rule-making function, section 3(a) of the
173. See MICHELMAN & SANDALOW 353.

174. See Dairy Belle Farms v. Brock, 97 Cal. App. 2d 146, 155, 217 P.2d 704,710 (1950);
Vickers v. Township Comm., 37 NJ. 232, 181 A.2d 129 (1962), cert. denied, 371 US. 233
(1963); City ofFon du Lacv. Town of Empire, 273 Wis. 333,77 N.W.2d 699,701(1956).
175. 42 U.S.C. § 1857(a)(3) (Supp. IV, 1969).
176. The effectiveness of the advisory council in the Bay Area Pollution Control District has
been encouraging. HEW has utilized a similar concept in several different areas. The National
Air Pollution Research and Development Advisory Committee, composed of representatives of
the chemical, engineering, biomedical, and socioeconomic disciplines, provides research
recommendations. Six other advisory committees-Fuel Additives, Air Quality Criteria,
Control Techniques, Control Agency Development, Manpower Development, and Research
Grants-bolster the expertise of NAPCA. In addition, meetings with major industrial concerns
to facilitate communications and understanding have been successful. See FIRST REPORT 80.
177. Public participation in administrative decision-making has recently received judicial
recognition in Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966), and should be incorporated into administrative decisionmaking machinery. See Hanks &Hanks, An EnvironmentalBill ofRights: The Citizen Suit and
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. 24 RUTGERS L. REv. 230 (1970); Sive, Some
Thoughts of an EnvironmentalLawyer in the Wilderness ofAdministrative Law, 70 COLUM. L.
REv. 612 (1970).

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

Model State Administrative Procedure Act and most states require a
public hearing for objection and discussion prior to adoption of a fee
schedule. 78 Once such calculations are determined on the basis of
HEW or other agency data, valid objections to the rate-setting
process are generally futile because of the complex technological basis
of cost-benefit studies; the rule-making hearing is thus relegated to a
mere formality. The cost-benefit techniques to be utilized and the
damages to be included would be more advantageously considered at
a hearing, possibly conducted by the advisory council, prior to the
investigatory stage. The proposed data-collection methods could be
enunciated in laymen's terms, and industry suggestions and
objections could be elicite'd.
The administrative agency must satisfy the notice and hearing
requirements imposed by most states in developing procedures for
implementing its self-monitoring 79 and fee collection functions.
Agency action must fall within the ambit of the enabling statute,
indicating the desirability of a comprehensive delegation of power to
the agency. The hearing itself must provide all parties with a
reasonable opportunity to express objections, but no formal
requirements are imposed by the Model Act.'1 The notice and hearing
requirements are dispensed with when emergencies such as an
atmospheric inversion require immediate operational controls.)"
More stringent hearing requirements are encountered in such
contested agency rulings as those requiring certain monitoring
equipment or imposing sanctions for nonpayment of a fee. Discovery
procedures, pre-trial hearings, evidentiary requirements, right to
counsel, judicial review, and other incidents of formal litigation are
imposed in such situations with varying degrees of consistency by
many states and the Model Act.8 2 Extreme sanctions such as the
enjoining of plant operation for nonpayinent of a fee merit strict
13
enforcement of procedural requirements.
Self-Monitoring
The use of a system whereby individual sources are required to
monitor continually the volume and nature of their emittants has
COOPER 194.
See Self-Monitoring

infra.

§
Id.
See id. §§
See
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already been proposed in this comment. Implementation of such a
program could take several forms. Generally, the effluent fee agency
would require each polluter to install a multicomponent measuring
device or several single component devices.18 Depending upon the
availability of financial resources, the agency could provide the
emitter the device to insure uniformity and accuracy; certify available
instruments meeting required standards; develop specific standards
for measuring instruments; or, until automatic monitoring devices are
developed, require periodic samples to be taken and analyzed in lieu of
continuous monitoring."" Once the device is installed, the agency
could insure accurate recording of effluent type and volume by several
methods. First, its own inspectors could visit each installation
periodically to determine the pollution level from the recording
instruments for computing the fee for a particular period, a procedure
analogous to the monitoring of gas and water consumption. Second,
the agency could require the polluter to make periodic pollution
reports and could insure accuracy by unannounced inspections of
pollution sources in the area.'" Specific violations could be discovered
by cross checking a firm's reports with those of similar firms in the
same industry or by regional monitoring as now conducted by
NAPCA.1 7 Self-reporting accompanied by spot inspections and
comprehensive cross checks has long been used successfully by the
Internal Revenue Service.'
Camara and See Limitations
Any conceivable administrative inspection procedure for
enforcing such a monitoring system must satisfy fourth amendment
protections against unreasonable search and seizure, especially if a
criminal sanction is to be available for violations of the reporting
requirements. These protections apply not only to the private citizen
but the corporate entity as well, 89 although it has been asserted that
184. The development of remote stack monitoring, although of great benefit to the
FIRST REPORT 61. Cf. FORTUNE, Oct.,

monitoring effort, may well prove costly or impossible.
1970, at 13.

185. See, e.g., PHILADELPHIA, PA., AIR MANAGEMENT CODE clh. 3-300, § 3-301(7) (1969).
186. The procedural requirements for such inspections are discussed in Camara and See
Limitationssubsection of text infra.
187. See FIRST REPORT 53-58.
188. See B. BrrrKER, FEDERAL INCOME ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 893-903 (1964).
189. See Lanza v. New York, 370 US. 139, 143 (1962); United States v. DiCorvo, 37 F.2d
124, 132-33 (D. Conn. 1927)..
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the corporate right of privacy is deserving of a lesser degree of

protection.''

Two 1967 Supreme Court decisions, Camara v.

Municipal Court' and See v. City of Seattle," 2 consider whether a

warrant is required, when it must be sought, and the requisite
probable cause that must be shown. In Camarathe Court held that an
administrative search of a private residence requires a search warrant
if the occupant refuses entry, and See extended this mandate to
commercial establishments.13 The court in Camara also indicated

that the fourth amendment required a lesser showing of probable
cause for an administrative search warrant than for a criminal search
warrant. "4 The reasonableness of a particular search is determined by
"balancing the need to search against the invasion which the search
entails,"' 95 considering whether the administrative program has a

long history of judicial and public acceptance, whether inspection is
the only acceptable means of abating a dangerous condition of

definite public concern, and whether the invasion of privacy is
sufficiently tempered by the impersonality of the search and the

absence of any intent to find criminal evidence. "'

The Court

specifically excluded emergency inspections from the warrant

requirement'9 7 and acknowledged the necessity of issuing warrants
without requiring an attempt to inspect when surprise is crucial. "'
A inspection system based upon periodic, unannounced agency

inspections of self-monitoring devices would be subject to the Camara
and See limitations. Such inspections will arise where the records

given by the polluter create suspicions of illegal activity, where visible
effluents or other observable activities are inconsistent with reported
190. See United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632,652 (1950).
191. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
192. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
193. This approach abandons the traditional requirement that a warrant issue prior to the
search. The court equivocates on the issue:". . . it seems likely that warrants should normally
be sought only after entry is refused ....
Id. at 539 (emphasis added). If warrants were
allowed before the refusal of entry, however, the occupant would risk criminal prosecution by
refusing entry, a result the court sought to avoid. Id. at 532. Thus, despite its indefinite language,
the Court's opinion must be interpreted to require an initial attempt to conduct a consent search
before a warrant may be sought. See Note, Search and Seizure-Probable Cause-Housing
Inspections Require Warrant or Consent, 3 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS--CIV. Lw. L. REv. 209, 216
(1967).
194. 387 US. at 538-39.
195. Id. at 537.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 539.
198. Id. at 539-40; See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. at 545 n.6.
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pollution levels, or where the administrative agency initiates a

program of random inspections to insure honest reporting. In all three
instances Camara requires that the corporation refuse entry to the
inspector before a warrant may be issued. 99 Pollution control
inspections would not satisfy the surprise 2°° exception since the two or
three hour post-refusal, pre-warrant period affords little opportunity

for the polluters to remedy pollution producing practices 211 or to
disguise prior tampering with self-monitoring equipment.

The requirements to satisfy the probable cause test differ for
inspections based upon suspicions concerning a particular polluter
and purely random inspections. In the former case, the traditional
requirement20 2 of substantial evidence that conditions constitute a
specific code violation could usually be met by introducing

monitoring records or testimony of observed industrial activity, thus
rendering unnecessary further inquiry into the balancing test espoused
in Camara. Where random area inspections are made or where
available evidence fails to satisfy traditional requirements for a
specific search, the factors expressed in Camara must be met in
determining probable cause for a warrant. As to the first Camara
factor,2 3periodic and area inspections have a "long history ofjudicial

and public acceptance

m

albeit not for pollution violations. Second,

the public interest in abating pollution is great, and both random and

25
specific inspections are necessary to the self-monitoring approach. 1

Third, the inspections constitute only a restricted invasion of privacy
199. The warrant requirement only arises when entry is refused the inspector. It is doubtful
that many corporations would do so at the risk of incurring the suspicion of the agency. Viewed
in this light, the warrant requirement under Camara would not be particularly burdensome to
the administrative agency.
200. See note 198 supra and accompanying text.
20 1. A changeover to a higher grade, low pollution fuel would be virtually impossible during
this period.
202. See, e.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
203. See note 195 supra and accompanying text.
204. One commentator, however, disputes the accuracy of this conclusion and the relevance
of the factor itself. LaFave, Administration Searchesand the Fourth Amendment: The Camara
and See Cases, 1967 SUP. CT. REV. I, 14. Since the court mentioned it as one of three
"persuasive factors" in the balance and not an absolute requirement, less weight could be
accorded the history-of-public-acceptance factor in the face of strength in the remaining factors.
Thus, LaFave's view of the factors would not be fatal to the area search.
205. A possible consideration underlying the court's language here is whether the traditional
probable cause test would yield acceptable results. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 US.
523, 537 (1967). Certainly random and specific searches, which the traditional probable cause
test would often preclude, arevital to the policing of a self-monitoring scheme.
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in view of the limited protection accorded corporations2 and the
impersonal nature of the search. 21 A probable cause test based on

these somewhat nebulous factors apparently utilizes a more liberal
evidentiary requirement than traditionally required in criminal

searches. Random area inspections which are made only as a
deterrent to false reporting and are not based upon any suspected
violation could meet this diluted standard based on their periodic
necessity since the passage of time was specifically cited in Camara as

justification for the issuance of a warrant °8 Denial of a warrant for
random inspections could substantially hinder the self-monitoring
program, but corporate knowledge that entry refusals would alert the

administering agency to violations makes extensive refusals unlikely.
SubpoenaRequirements
An alternative to inspections would be the issuance of a subpoena
duces tecum to require the production of monitoring records. 2 °1

of the fourth amendment as a
Although within the 2purview
10
"constructive" search,

such an administrative subpoena would

encounter little difficulty in meeting the requirements of scope
limitation, relevance, and specificity . 2 1 The specificity and relevance

of monitoring records, production of which would impose a slight
burden upon the polluters, would easily satisfy these constitutional
requirements, especially since great weight is generally accorded the
administrative decision.212 Beyond this, few limitations are imposed
206. See note 190 supra and accompanying text.
207. In this regard the Court also mentioned that the Camara search was not "aimed at the
discovery of evidence of a crime." 387 U.S. at 537. The basis of the monitoring-records search is
not the suspicion of criminal activity, although a prosecution may result as in Camara,
Presumably the Court was more impressed by the limited intrusion on personal privacy that
attends such a search. See LaFave, supra note 204, at 17-20. The time period is short, facilities
rather than personal belongings are searched, and no social stigma is attached to a monitoring
records search.
208. The Camara court found that in the case ofbuilding inspections, the passage of time, the
nature of the building, or the condition of an area would constitute probable cause for a search.
387 US. at 538.
209. Most states allow the agency itself to issue the subpoena. See, e.g.. IOWA CODE
ANN. § 622.81 (1950); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 200 (1962). See Benton, Administrative
Subpoena Enforcement, 41 TEXAS L. REv. 874,895-902 (1963); 1 COOPER 294-313. The agency
generally cannot, however, impose its own sanction upon noncompliance and must seek court
enforcement. I COOPER 297; cf. I K. DAvis, supra note I ll, § 3.11. The subpoena duces tecum
could be issued when no records or only incomplete ones are submitted or, under a meter
inspection system with written feed-out, where entry is refused the inspector.
210. See Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186,202 (1946).
211. Id. at 208-09.
212. See I COOPER 301.
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upon the subpoena power,21 3 reflecting its desirability in a
comprehensive monitoring scheme.
The development of remote stack monitoring devices 1 4 would
avoid many of these inspection requirements. A central computer
system with inputs from all monitored sources could also greatly

diminish the need for inspections. 15
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS

Police Power
Courts have generally upheld air pollution regulations as a valid

exercise of the state's police power, characterizing control efforts as
necessary to protect society against a significant danger to public

health and welfare.2 1 An air pollution control scheme such as an
effluent fee program would probably be considered a public welfare

protection measure.2 17 Such a conclusion, however, should not be
lightly reached. Situations exist where the aggregate public welfare
may be decreased by control efforts. Public welfare in a town

economically dependent upon an industry forced to close as the result
of an effluent fee scheme is more likely impaired than benefited. 218 The
213. These limitations preclude the inspector in the field from both issuing and enforcing the
subpoena and require that judicial review be accorded the party before sanctions are imposed for
failure to comply. See See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541,544-45 (1967). The corporate polluter
may not claim the privilege against self-incrimination in this situation. United States v.
Silverstein, 314 F.2d 789 (2d Cir. 1963).
214. See note 184 supra.
215. A model for such a plan can be seen in NAPCA's continuous air monitoring program
which involves telemetering of data from remote stations. See FRisT REPORT 54.
216. See Northwestern Laundry v. Des Moines, 239 U.S. 486,491-92 (1916); Ballentine v.
Nester, 350 Mo. 58, 164 S.W.2d 378 (1942); Sittner v. City of Seattle, 62 Wash. 2d 834, 384
P.2d 859 (1963).
217. See cases cited in note 216 supra.
218. Such situations have developed in the past and may be expected in the future with more
stringent control laws. The Elk Paper Manufacturing Company, for example, was forced to
close its pulp and paper mill after private litigation resulted in a substantial damage award.
Phillips v. Elk Paper Mfg. Co., Equity No. 1577-b (Cecil Cty., Md., County Ct., April 17,
1969). Closure due to pollution abatement costs, however, is not likely. The additional control
expenditure for a number of existing industries has been estimated at only 0.5 percent of value
added by manufacture, a cost most industries could easily absorb. See Gerhardt, supra note 25,
at 363. The preclusive effect of economic dependency on pollution considerations is clearly
reflected by the following letter from a fertilizer plant employee's wife who had previously signed
a petition protesting the plant's pollution.
I am sorry about this matter. I was misinformed. My husband has worked for one of the
phosphate plants for 21 years. The mine has been ourbread and butter. We have not been
harmed in any way mentioned above. Thank you. P.S. The dust does get pretty bad.
Florida Air Pollution Control Commission, Minutes, Sept. 16, 1966, 2 Florida State Bd. of
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public welfare concept, however, encompasses the removal of

damaging nuisances despite public benefit from them. The public is
forced to recognize the effect of air pollution on their health when they
would not have voluntarily done so.19 A further problem arises when

a fee is charged for pollution which does not produce adverse health
effects or material property damage since the concept of public

welfare may not encompass purely aesthetic control measures.M An
odor-causing pollutant, for example, may cause no adverse health

effects but presents an unpleasant and annoying nuisance. 221 The
answer to this limitation is that aesthetic considerations rarely are the

sole ramification of even an odor source. Property values in the
affected areas are generally decreased by the aesthetically displeasing

conditions,22 and the enjoyment of such property is reduced by
malodorous or unsightly conditions. So little is known of the health
effects of many pollution elements that even low level emissions may

not be considered free of damaging impact, particularly of a
psychosomatic nature. In addition, under certain atmospheric

conditions such as an inversion delimiting a dispersion area, emissions
Health, 1966 (mimeographed), reprintedin Crocker, Some Economics ofA ir Pollution, 8 NAT.
RES. J. 236,242 (1968).
219. This argument presupposes that the aggregate welfare of the community is increased
since the health and property benefits accruing to the populace outweigh the economic harm
done to them. Cf. MICHELMAN &SANDALOW 34. I n economic terms, the polluter in this instance
has heretofore derived its very existence from its ability to impose the externality of pollution
damage on the community. See note 31 supra. When that cost is partially "internalized," its
profit margin cannot absorb the expense.
220. See MICHELMAN & SANDALOW 22; Michelman, Toward a PracticalStandardfor
Aesthetic Regulation, 15 PRACTICAL LAWYER, Feb. 1969, at 36. The Supreme Court has found
that aesthetic considerations are definitely related to public welfare. As asserted in Berman v.
Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954): "It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the
community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as
well as carefully patrolled." Id. at 33. This proposition is supported by John Stuart Mill's view
of individual liberty that public intervention is legitimate if an agent's behavior results in
external impact on others. J.S. MILL, UTILITARIANISM, LIBERTY, AND REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT 176-77, 1839-89 (1950 ed.). That aesthetics fall within this permissible legislative
ambit is clear. See MICHELMAN & SANDALOW 24-25. However, many state courts have adhered
to the contrary position. See. e.g., People v. Dickenson, 171 Cal. App. 2d 872, 343 P.2d 809,
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 894 (1959); Town of Vestal v. Bennett, 199 Misc. 41, 104 N.Y.S.2d 830
(Sup. Ct. 1950); State v. Brown, 250 N.C. 54, 108 S.E.2d 74 (1959); Ghaster Properties, Inc. v.
Preston, 194 N.E.2d 158 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963), rev'd 176 Ohio St. 425,200 N.E.2d 328 (1964).
221. The flexible term "aesthetic" would seem to encompass odor although several
commentators have taken a narrow view of the term to include only visual attractiveness. See
Dukeminier, Zoningfor A esthetic Objectives: A Reappraisal,20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROD. 218
n.2 (1955); Note, ConstitutionalLaw: Police Power: Property Restrictions Based on Aesthetic
Considerations,11 U.C.L.A. L. R~v. 859,861 n.l I(1964).
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normally only aesthetically displeasing may accumulate and seriously
affect public welfare. These considerations may become academic
since the minority rule allowing aesthetic considerations alone to
constitute a basis for the exercise of the police power has recently
gained additional proponents and may displace the contrary general
rule.2
Even if a portion of the fee schedule is deemed to be solely

aesthetically based, the taxing power may be used where necessary as
a justification for the imposition of that portion of the fee. The
regulatory nature of the effluent fee would not preclude its

consideration as an exercise of the taxing power since similar taxes
have been upheld. m Further, the concurrent utilization of the police

and taxing power has been judicially sanctioned.

5

Limitationson the Police Power
Reasonable Nexus. As an exercise of the police power, the
effluent fee scheme encounters the due process requirement that

legislation must be reasonably adapted to the ends sought and that a
nexus must exist between the regulatory provisions and their avowed

purposeY6 Once this requirement is met, no degree of "taking" will
be considered violative of due process, even if the destruction of

property is involved. n 7 The "taking" in the usual situation would

include 'either the required payment of the fee, the installation of
expensive abatement equipment, or the required installation of
monitoring equipment. Despite the strong presumption of
222. This factor alone has been sufficient tojustify aesthetic regulations in several states. See.
e.g.. Best v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 393 Pa. 106, 141 A.2d 606 (1958); State ex rel. Saveland
Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, 69 N.W.2d 217, cert. denied, 350 US. 841
(1955). Their emphasis is misplaced, however. Property, values are derived from the aesthetic
condition and serve only to provide objective evidence of the public's reaction to the aesthetically
displeasing condition. See MICHELMAN & SANDALOW 24.
223. See, e.g.. Sunad Inc. v. City of Sarasota, 122 So. 2d 611,615 (Fla. 1960); Oregon City v.
Hartlke, 240 Ore. 126, 400 P.2d 255 (1965); People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191 N.E.2d 272,
240 N.YS.2d 734 (1963).
224. See, e.g., United States v. Kahriger, 345 US. 22 (1953), overruled in anotherrespect.
Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968); Magnano v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40 (1934). The
fee's characterization as a tax is discussed in notes 88-107 supra and accompanying text.
225. See City of Georgetown v. Morrison, 362 S.W.2d 289, 291 (Ky. Ct. App. 1962).
226. See Northwestern Laundry v. Des Moines, 239 U.S. 486 (1916); Lawton v. Steele, 152
U.S. 133 (1894); Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. White River Distributors, Inc., 224 Ark.
558,275 S.W.2d 455 (1955); City of Rochester v. McCauley-Fien Milling Co., 199 N.Y. 207,92
N.E. 641 (1910).
227. Northwestern Laundry Co. v. Des Moines, 239 U.S. 486 (1916). See note 218 supra.and
accompanying text.
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constitutionality for the legislative pronouncement of a nexus,28 some

difficulty may be encountered in demonstrating the causal
relationship between the fee schedule and public health and property

damage. First, scientific knowledge is deficient concerning the effects
of certain pollutants upon man and property. 2 2 For example, a fee
schedule based upon the emission -of sulphur oxides would have little

scientific substantiation.

230

Effective air pollution legislation,

however, cannot await extensive scientific investigation in view of the

immediacy of the pollution problem. The evidence required to validate
such a regulation need only raise a reasonable possibility that a
scientific basis does exist for the fee schedule. Such an evidentiary
showing renders the presumption in favor of the regulatory measure
irrebuttable.2
? 3 The publication of HEW criteria or other scientific

works indicating or at least suggesting the adverse effects of emittants
should meet the information requirement. 2
Computation Uncertainties
The effluent fee scheme is vulnerable to substantive due process

objections upon a second ground. The cost-benefit relationship which
forms the basis for the fee schedule requires the determination of the
emitter's cost saving function and the receptor's damage function. As
previously indicated, little-known synergistic mechanisms which

amplify effects of component pollutants greatly hinder damage
computations.?

Also, no adequate means have been derived to

ascertain numerically the diverse nature of the damages caused by
various pollutants. A prominent economist in the ecology field has

labelled past studies attempting such calculation on a "problem
shed" level as "crude" and casually administered.

4U

Although more

228. See Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 US. 520,524 (1959).
229. SeeSTAFF REPORT 5-9.
230. Pursuant to the Air Quality Act, Air Quality Criteria for Sulphur Oxides (1967), was
issued by HEW, reflecting the current level of research in this area. The publication fails to
provide any viable indication of the effects of sulphur oxides. See Cassell 215.
231. See People v. Tatje, 203 Misc. 949,953, 121 N.YS).d 147,151 (N.Y. City Magis. Ct.
1953); 9 B.C. IND. & Com. L. REV. supra note 72, at 736-37.
232. As the Senate report asserted:
The day of precise quantitative measurement of the health and welfare effects of air
pollution has not yet arrived. Until such measurement is possible, action must be based
upon limited knowledge, guided by the principle of the enhancement of the quality of
human life. STAFF REPORT 1.
233. See Id. at 8. See notes 61-62 supra.
234. See Kneese, How Much is Air Pollution Costing Us in the United States?, PROCEEDINGS
529, 531. See also Wolozin, supra note 73, at 237.
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precise and thorough damage studies are now being conducted by
HEW, similar impediments remain.? State effluent fee programs
must rely either on existing projects, future HEW studies, or local
government or private cost-benefit studies. Although weaknesses in
investigatory techniques create some doubt concerning their accuracy,

a polluter challenging them would have difficulty proving that the
studies lack scientific substantiation. The issue of the validity of the

cost-benefit analysis would be eliminated in a scheme employing the
effluent standard-fee or the ambient air quality standard-fee
approaches. Under both methods the fee schedule is prepared in

relation to pre-determined national standards, not simply the
pollution damage function. 236 Extensive HEW studies prior to

promulgation of national standards should effectively preclude a
7
challenge to the standards or the schemes themselves.2

Less-Restrictive-Alternative Test

The "less-restrictive-alternative" principle has been abandoned
by the Supreme Court but has maintained vitality in some state
courts

m

This economic due process principle may be relevant if no

federal preemptive legislation is in effect.? 9 An economic regulation

violates the requirements of due process under this standard if the

government can achieve the desired goals through a less restrictive

alternative regulation.Y° The alternatives to an effluent fee scheme

have been discussed previously: direct regulation through effluent
standards;2 4 ' subsidy payments to encourage abatement; 24 2 tax

benefits for abatement expenditures;23 and regulation or prohibition
of certain pollution activities. 244 Application of the "less-restrictive-

alternative" principle to these control options indicates that the

effluent fee scheme would be clearly less restrictive than the regulation
235. See note 57 supra and accompanying text.
236. See note 86 supra and accompanying text.
237. See note 232 supra and accompanying text.
238. Struve, The Less-Restrictive-Alternative Principle and Economic Due Process, 80

HARV. L. REv. 1463 (1967). See Olsen v. Nebraska ex rel. Western Reference & Bond Ass'n,
Inc., 313 US. 236,246-47 (1941); Trio Distrib. Corp. v. City of Albany, 2 N.Y.2d 690,693-96,
143 N.E.2d 329, 330-32, 163 N.YS.2d 585, 587-89 (1957).
239. See Effluent Fee Scheme Under the A ct subsection of text supra.

240.
241.
242.
243.
244.

See Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504,513-17 (1924).
See notes 19-24 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 30-32 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 25-29 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 14-15 supraand accompanying text.
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or prohibition of pollution activities and arguably less restrictive than

effluent standards. The effluent fee approach gives the polluter a
viable alternative to abatement by allowing him to pay a fee;

therefore, it is less restrictive than either type of direct regulation,
both of which involve a mandate to abate. The effluent fee scheme is
more restrictive than direct regulation, however, when it is applied to
pollution levels below that of the normal effluent standard to provide

an incentive for increased abatement efforts. Since the courts do not
consider an alternative which is less restrictive in one facet but more
restrictive in another to be preclusive,2 45 the effluent fee scheme

satisfies this due process test vis a vis direct regulation.
The subsidy payment and tax benefit approaches should not be
considered equally effective alternatives to an effluent fee scheme. The

tax benefit provides less compulsion than a required fee payment and
results in a misallocation of resources when a polluter decides to abate

rather than employ less costly alternatives.2" The subsidy program
also fails to coerce abatement effectively and places the cost of

pollution upon the general public rather than the polluter or the
consumer of the polluter's goods.u 7 The "less-restrictive-alternative"

principle is thus no impediment since the two approaches do not
qualify as viable alternatives to the effluent fee scheme.

M

Taking
Courts have recognized the defense of "unavoidable necessity" in

those situations where a polluter cannot technologically or otherwise
meet direct regulatory requirements.2 41 Sanctions under these

circumstances are deemed to constitute an unconstitutional "taking"
of the polluter's property.2 The statutory enactments, including the
245. Struve, supra note 238, at 1463.
246. See notes 25-28 supra and accompanying text.
247. See notes 30-32 supra and accompanying text.
248. A further application of this economic due process principle may arise in questioning the
excessiveness of a fee schedule. The modicum of proof required would seem to be
insurmountable, however. See 9 B.C. IND. &CoM. L. REv., supra note 72, at 737.
249. See People v. Cunard White Star, Ltd., 280 N.Y. 413, 21 N.E.2d 489 (1939); People v.
Savage, I Misc. 2d 337, 148 N.Y.S.2d 191 (Erie County Sup. Ct.), affdnmemn., 309 N.Y. 941,
132 N.E.2d 313 (1955); Polloack, infra note 256, at 345-48. An example of such a technological
void exists in the control of sulphur oxides. A panel of the National Academy of Engineering
and the National Research Council concluded that low sulphur-oxide standards would not be
met by current available low-sulphur fuels or control processing methods. I BNA,
E.R.-CuRREm DEVELOPMENTs 78 (1970).
250. People v. Savage, I Misc. 337, 148 N.Y.S.2d 191 (Erie County Sup. Ct. 1955).
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Air Quality Act, " ' have generally recognized this defense by allowing
the issuance of "variances" for unavoidable emissions. 252 This
exception to regulatory programs has caused extensive administrative
problems, the defense often being claimed by the polluter as a matter
of course regardless of the actual necessity involved. The effluent fee
scheme wisely avoids the requirement of such variances since the
polluter is provided with the alternative of paying the fee rather than
being directed to abate in situations where technology is inadequate.2
The polluter is then paying for the cost of his pollution upon the
public, and no unconstitutional taking is involved.
For similar reasons such a "taking" would not be present where
an established fee is increased by the arrival of a new pollution source
which multiplies the polluter's damage contribution through
synergistic effects. The polluter is merely compensating the public for
damages caused by his pollution, even though external effects may
increase the amount of that damage.54
A polluter arguably has a vested right in a fee schedule which
could be the subject of a "taking" in that he has relied upon the
existing standard in planning his abatement program.21 Standards,
251. 42 U.S.C. § 1857d (Supp. IV, 1969). See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 203.110(3) (Supp.

1969).
252. An example of the variance procedures is found in Ingraham v. Peter Cooper Corp., I
BNA, E.R.-DEclsIoNs 1409 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Cattaraugus Cty., June 12, 1970), where a
variance was granted despite the New York Attorney General's contention that this represents
the first step in an endless progression of extensions. Regardless of necessity, an effluent fee
scheme would impose a feeduring the non-abatement period.
253. The situation has often arisen whereby stringent effluent standards are enacted in
response to public pressure, as in Pennsylvania. Mr. Allen Brandt, chairman of the state air
pollution control commission, stated that the standards could not be "reached in that area with
current technology." The Wall St. Journal, Oct. 21, 1969, at 29, col. 3. An anomalous result
ensues since variances will likely insulate industry from the stricter emission standards, while
under the fee scheme, the polluter would pay for his unabatable emissions.
254. The court in Maine v. Johnson, I BNA, E.R.-DEcISIONS 1353 (Me. Sup. Jud. Ct., May
21, 1970), found a "taking" to occur when a party was required to pay more than its just share
of a state-wide conservation program, a consideration wholly apart from the program's
commendable purpose. Id. at 1356. Thus, where marshland owners were enjoined by the state
from filling their property, the marshland conservation program placed too great a burden on
the individual landowners. Charging air polluters with the extent of their damage, whether
enhanced by synergistic effects or not, would seem "Just" within the Maine court's substantive
due process test.
255. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,413-16 (1922). Some courts have
placed emphasis on this factor in the balancing process to determine the reasonableness of the
regulation. See Scott County v. Paaske, 250 Iowa 1293, 1299, 98 N.W.2d 827, 831 (1959);
Hines, Nor Any Drop to Drink. Public Regulation of Water Quality, Part I, State Pollution
Control Programs, 52 Iowx L. REv. 186, 213-14 (1966). If viewed as a property right, the
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however, are inherently changeable, and detrimental reliance would be
difficult to show where changes caused by the implementation of a
revised effluent fee scheme were not substantial. Effluent fee schedules
would, of course, be subject to adjustment for climatic and seasonal
changes as they are for synergistic effects. 2
Equal Protection
Low Versus High Volume Polluters. Although an effluent fee
scheme necessarily entails unequal treatment of various types of
polluters, it should encounter little difficulty in meeting the
constitutional requirements of reasonableness, non-arbitrariness, and
reasonable relation to the objects dealt with and the public purpose
involved. 217 One form of necessary discrimination involves the
implementation of a direct regulatory program for low-volume
" Such a classification on the basis of pollution type and
emitters.zs
volume could conceivably grant to a larger polluter an advantage over
the smaller polluter in the same industry. The effluent fee arrangement
permits the larger polluter to choose his optimum cost pollution
abatement level while the smaller polluter, possibly a competitor, is
subjected to a required abatement schedule.2 59 The smaller firm,
however, may consequently be relieved of the substantial expense of a
self-monitoring scheme. 21 ° The basis of the discrimination, which
could conceivably favor the large or small polluter depending upon
the circumstances, derives from the impractical requirement of selfschedule reliance should not be considered of any greater worth than other property rights
subject to the taking.
256. Further due process objections would be assuaged by couching the purpose clause of
effluent fee enabling legislation in terms of "prention and control" rather than "efficient
management and allocation of air resources." Compare N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE § 892-1.0
(1963), employing the control concept, with CHICAGO MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 17 (1967). See also
Pollack, Legal Boundaries of Air Pollution-Stateand Local Legislative Purpose and
Techniques. 33 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoa. 331,339 (1968). The latter term implies public sharing
of private property, requiring compensation. See Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 US. 590 (1962);
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 US. 393 (1922); Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 75
YALE LJ.364 (1964). A further ramification of the air resource management statute is that

zoning legislation may be deemed analogous, thus subjecting the scheme to the pre-existing nonconformity use defense. See generally Heath, Some Legal Questions Relating to Air Quality
ManagementA-1 (Paper presented at Canadian Conference, Toronto 1969).
257. See Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 US. 483,489 (1955); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic
Gas Co., 220 US.61 (1911).

258. See notes 78-80 supra and accompanying text.
259. Id.

260. The direct regulation may, however, require sampling or periodic monitoring systems.
See, e.g., PHILADELPHIA, PA., AIR MANAGEMENT CODE ch. 3-300, § 3-301(7).
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monitoring systems for all polluters and the administrative
difficulties' that inhere in an all-inclusive program which seeks to
encompass low-volume polluters. The distinctions being reasonable
and necessary to the successful implementation of an effluent fee
control scheme, the equal protection standard is met.
Large Versus Small Firms. A further distinction attributable to

the effluent fee or the effluent-fee standard scheme lies in the limited
alternative provided the smaller firm to respond to the fee schedule.
Most firms will determine the least cost level of abatement for their
facilities and pay the appropriate fee; the polluter is thus provided a
continuing incentive to develop less costly, more efficient abatement
techniques. The smaller firm, however, is often unable to respond to
this research incentive since it lacks the financial capabilities
necessary for a pervasive research effort. Subjected to this limitation,
the firm's abatement choice is circumscribed by what is economically
and technologically feasible until the pollution control industry
develops more efficient devices enabling the firm to reduce its costs
through abatement. Research efforts by larger firms, pollution
equipment manufacturers, and governmental agencies, possibly
funded by effluent fees, 262 could provide the small firm with innovative
technology, mitigating its research disadvantage. 23
Rural Versus Urban Polluters. An additional classification

resulting from an effluent fee system is that involving the fee schedules
for rural and urban polluters. A substantial schedule discrepancy
could arise between these polluters since the nature and amount of
urban pollution damage usually predominates over rural damages due
to low population densities and reduced property values. Also,
synergistic mechanisms which multiply the effects of the urban
polluter's emissions and result in a larger fee have less impact in rural
areas. The fact that both polluters' fees theoretically6 reflect the
damage each emitter causes seems to justify the distinction. The
respective fees should approximate the amounts a court would
assess26 5 either polluter in a class action by pollution victims,
261. See note 80 supra and accompanying text.
262. See note 51 supra and accompanying text.
263. The class defined by the statute, that of all polluters above a minimum effluent level,
clearly involves a reasonable basis despite the possible incidental size discrimination.
264. The difficulties inherent in such a determination are discussed in Objections subsection
of text supra.
265. Presumably, the fee would reflect elements of damage not deemed awardable by a court

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1970:943

vindicating the geographic distinction as a reasonable and necessary
one.2'
Information Advantage. The firms relegated to extensive
research efforts and large fees because of deficient knowledge
concerning their particular emissions are economically disadvantaged
vis a vis emitters of controllable, well-researched pollutants.2 7 Equal
protection requirements are met since the class defined by the statute,
those emitters of similar pollutants, has a clearly reasonable

foundation and is necessary to correlate the cost-benefit function. The
emitter subjected to a direct regulatory scheme could usually obtain a
variance under these circumstances, 28s but the effluent fee more

effectively allocates the pollution cost while providing a research
incentive to reduce that cost.
MAINTENANCE OF ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES

Private
Many commentators consider private remedies the most effective
alternative to direct governmental pollution control.21 In the past,
private actions under theories such as private and public nuisance,210

trespass,21 negligence, or strict liability z2 have not been extensively

of law either because of the difficulty in showing causation or the receptor's remoteness from the
pollution source. See, e.g., Phillips v. Elk Paper Mfg. Co., Equity No. 1577-B (Cecil Cty., Md.,
County Ct., April 17, 1969).
266. The Senate Committee on Public Works recognized the necessity of regional variations
of emission control requirements. SENATE REPORT 30.
267. The technological lag in many instances may be due to the lack of industry-supported
research efforts. The incentive provided by the effluent fee approach should spur such research
programs.
268. See note 252 supra and accompanying text.
269. See Cassell; Esposito, supra note 16; Juergensmeyer, supra note 38. But see Edelman,
supra note 36.
270. Various obstacles such as "balancing of equities," Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur,
Copper & Iron Co., 113 Tenn. 331, 83 S.W. 658 (1904), the requirement of "special injury" in
the case of public nuisance, Holman v. Athens Empire Laundry Co., 149 Ga. 345, 100 S.E. 207
(1919), and "coming to the nuisance," Waschak v. Moffatt, 379 Pa. 441, 109 A.2d 310 (1954),
have impeded the success of nuisance actions. See generally Jurgensmeyer, supra note 38. These
obstacles, however, are becoming less significant. The standing requirements have been recently
lowered. Road Review League v. Boyd, 270 F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). Modification of the
burden of proof rule also seems to be developing. See Texas Eastern Transmission Corp. v.
Wildlife Preserves, Inc., 48 NJ. 261, 225 A.2d 130 (1966). See generally The Conservation
Foundation Letter, Sept. 30, 1969.
271. The "balancing of equities" approach has also mitigated the effectiveness of the trespass
action. See Arvidson v. Reynolds Metals Co., 125 F. Supp. 481,482-83 (W.D. Wash. 1954),
affd, 236 F.2d 224 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U .S.
968 (1957).
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utilized; however, the increased awareness regarding the pollution
problem and the development of more effective legal theories 273

indicate a possible reversal of this trend .2 4 Due to this renaissance,

consideration must be given to whether an effluent fee scheme should

preclude private actions. z5- Policy considerations dictate that it should
not. The political acceptability of the fee approach could possibly

depend on the availability to the private citizen of his personal right to
be free from pollution. Voters may be justifiably hesitant to release
their legal rights in favor of an untested state control scheme2 6 A
272. Proof of causation becomes insurmountable in many such cases. See, e.g.. Heck v.
Beryllium Corp.,424 Pa. 140,226 A.2d 87 (1966).
273. The potential of the public trust doctrine as an effective remedy has recently been
emphasized. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 473 (1970). The use of the class action could effectively
implement private remedies by concentrating individual litigation efforts and lowering litigation
costs. The citizens of El Paso, Texas, for example, have filed an action seeking one billion
dollars in damages and a permanent injunction against a major polluter. The Wall St. Journal,
Jan. 28, 1970, at4, col.4.
274. Further evidence of this trend is found in the promulgation of the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 83 Stat. 852 (1970), which may be interpreted as
enumerating the basic rights of the receptor-public and placing an affirmative duty upon all
governmental agencies to consider the environmental consequences of their acts, thus giving
legislative approval to Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir.
1965), and Office of Communications of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994
(D.C. Cir. 1966). See Hanks & Hanks, supra note 177. Judicial review of administrative action
limited to determining questions of law and scrutinizing whether factual findings are supported
by substantial evidence is thus accorded the environmental plaintiff. Differing judicial
approaches to this law-fact distinction are discussed in Sive, supra note 177, at 612-31. As of
August 1, 1970, seventeen legal actions and five administrative proceedings involving rights
asserted pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 had been instituted. A
listing of these actions is found in "Progress Report on Implementation of Section 102(2)(c) of
National Environmental Policy Act," Council on Environmental Quality, Sept. 16, 1970.
For an example of agency action, see Implementation of the National Environmental Policy
Act, FPC Order No. 415 (Dec. 4, 1970). Judicial interpretations of the Act similar to that
evinced in Pennsylvania Environmental Council v. Bartlett, 315 F. Supp. 238 (M.D. Pa. 1970),
however, could delimit the potential effectiveness of the act. The court relieved the Secretary of
Transportation of the responsibility of making an affirmative and independent determination
of the environmental effects of a highway project. The delegation of this responsibility
could often foreclose actions directed against federal officials.
275. The constitutionality of legislative abolishment of a private tort action when that right
has not yet vested has been generally upheld. See Magierowski v. Buckley, 39 NJ. Super. 534,
121 A.2d 749 (1956); Anderson v. Corporation Comm., 327 P.2d 699 (Okla. 1957); cf. CONN.
CoNsT. art. 1, § 10. The courts have divided, however, as to when that right accrues. Compare
Massa v. Nastri, 125 Conn. 144, 3 A.2d 839 (1939), with Carson v. Gare-Meenan Co., 229 F.
765 (1916). One view requires judgment to be rendered while the other apparently recognizes the
right when the injury occurs.
276. The effluent fee approach has apparently never been applied to air pollution, although
the scheme has been utilized in the Ruhr River Valley to control water quality. The basic
distinction between the air and water problems, however, preclude consideration of the Ruhr
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homeowner subjected to pollution resulting in substantial damages to
his person or residence would find little solace in the increased fee the
emitter would pay to the state. 7 Consider the public utility which,
because of its quasi-monopoly character, arguably may be able to
pass much of the fee to the consumer 27s who may also be the pollution
receptor. The citizen would be paying for the emission fee and yet
suffering the pollution damage. There is thus a strong argument for
maintaining private legal remedies against the polluter to make it
possible to avoid any double "payment" by the injured party. In
addition to equitable considerations, the retention of private remedies
provides additional pressure for the polluter to abate. In choosing a
high level of emittance for the concomitant high effluent fee, the
polluter would be incurring the risk of substantial private liability to
individual receptors. 9
experience as a vindication of the effluent fee air pollution control scheme. See Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, Water
PollutionControl,89th Cong., 2d Sess. 388,397 (1966).
The Senate version of H.R. 17255, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 304 (1970), as amended by the
Senate and sent to conference, 116 CONG. REC. 16,260 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1970), 2 [1969-70
Transfer Binder] CONG. INDEX, House Status Table, at 4932 (1970), statutorily recognizes the
use of the civil action to enforce its provisions. The current administration's support for private
actions, however, is questionable in view of the Internal Revenue Service's recent ambivalence
toward the tax exempt status of environmental litigation groups. Compare Internal Revenue
Service News Release, IR 1069 (October 9, 1970). with The Wall St. Journal, Oct. 15, 1970.
at 5, col. 1.
277. See, e.g., Heck v. Beryllium Corp., 424 Pa. 140, 226 A.2d 87 (1966), where the plaintiff
contracted berylliosis from extended exposure to defendant's pollution and claimed over
$100,000 in damages. The increasing incidence of similar actions attest to their importance to
individual litigants and the general public. As Russell Train, Chairman of the Council on
Environmental Quality, indicated in response to the temporary suspension of the tax-exempt
status of environmental litigation groups by the IRS: "Litigation brought by private groups
which must rely on contributions for their support . . . [has] strengthened and accelerated the
process of enforcement of antipollution laws." N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1970 at 1, col. 1. See also
Citizen's Committee for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 452 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
39 U.S.L.W. 3242 (U.S. Dec. 8. 1970); National Environmental Policy Act, § 102(2)(c),
42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (Supp. IV, 1969); Washington Post, Oct. 14, 1970 at A-18, cols. 1-2.
278. This conclusion does not necessarily follow. See notes 65-70 supra and accompanying
text.
279. The assertion of private rights would not appear to interfere with the implementation of
a fee scheme; thus, the state enactment should specifically state that none of its provisions arc
intended to diminish or preclude private remedies against the polluter. See. e.g.. ORE. REv.
STAT. § 449.820 (1)(1965). Contrary to the Oregon statute, however, the provision should not
be limited to nuisance actions. See Renken v. Harvey Aluminum, Inc., 226 F. Supp. 169 (D.
Ore. 1963), where strained judicial reasoning was necessary to avoid the nuisance limitation.
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Public
Alternative public remedies should also not be rejected by the

effluent fee scheme. Atmospheric conditions may temporarily require
strict limitations on industrial activity. Periodic pollution incidents
such as boiler malfunctions may also occur, resulting in extraordinary

damage but not significantly affecting the fee which is based on an
average emission level. This situation would warrant injunctive relief

or other public sanctions. If both the public and private sectors may
still act against polluters, industry will likely respond that they are in

no better position after the fee than before. The polluter, however, is
paying only for the right to use the public air space; he has not
purchased a license to pollute. He thus cannot damage private citizens

and remain immune from liability, nor can he abuse his use of the
air.8
CONCLUSION

Recent emphasis on direct regulation control programs merits
serious reconsideration by legislative bodies. The Air Quality Act of
1967 may very well be "a hopeless failure. 2 1 The effluent fee

approach presents a viable, practical alternative with distinct
abatement and political advantages. The promulgation of national

standards which has been given much attention by HEW and
Congress is particularly well suited to effluent fee implementation.

Such a combination avoids many of the current objections to the pure
economic effluent fee scheme administered without such standards.

The fee program is further enhanced by a program of self-monitoring
which would substantially reduce administrative costs while providing
an effective enforcement tool. The enactment of such a scheme cannot

and need not await extensive technological advancement or
280. Many states, although providing statutory remedies against polluters, preserve public
rights in addition to private rights. See. e.g., Air Pollution Control Act of June 12, 1968, 35 PA.
STAT. § 4012.1: "Nothing in this act shall be construed as impairing any right or remedy, now
or hereafter existing in equity, or under common or statutory law, to abate private or public
nuisances." See also Borough of Brookhaven v. American Rendering, Inc., 434 Pa. 290, 256
A.2d 626 (1969).
281. See note 121 supra. Lewis C. Green labelled the Act "misguided" and "immoral."
Address by Lewis C. Green Before the Air Pollution Control Association, St. Louis, Mo., June
I, 1970, reported in I BNA, E.R.-CUJRRENT DEVELOPMENTS 178 (1970). This conclusion was
reached in the Council on Environmental Quality's first report to Congress on August 10, 1970.
The Council asserted that the Air Quality Act "is no longer an adequate tool to cope with
current pollution problems." Id. at 413.
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completely accurate cost-benefit research in view of the pressing
pollution problem; present developments in the monitoring and
abatement fields are sufficient to effectuate a comprehensive fee
scheme. The state role is the main uncertainty in implementing a
national standard-fee program. The ideal of federal-state
"cooperative federalism," however, has found practical significance
in such areas as unemployment compensation, 8 2 oil industry
regulation,2 and, more recently, food inspection.2 These indicate the
effectiveness of state programs administering federal standards.
Whether this or a more federally dominated program is employed, the
effluent fee scheme merits serious consideration as the basic approach
in state and federal pollution control programs.
232. Unemployment Compensation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 502 (1964).
283. Oil and Gas Lands Leasing Act, 30 US.C. § 184(a) et seq. (1964).
284. Meat Inspection Act, 21 US.C. § 661 (Supp. IV, 1969).

